November 09, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Comparison is a critical element in drawing scientific conclusions, especially when examining similar factors under different circumstances, tracking their progression and trends across distinct instances. This holds true in physics, biology, natural sciences, astronomy, as well as in politics and war.
• The ongoing year-long war between the Lebanese resistance and the occupying army differs starkly from the confrontations before the occupying army’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. At that time, the resistance waged a prolonged guerrilla war to exhaust an occupying force and force its withdrawal – a form of warfare seen in global struggles against powerful armies, like the American forces in Vietnam and the Soviet, then American, forces in Afghanistan. The current war, however, is a rare conventional confrontation where the resistance is stationed at the Lebanese border to prevent the occupiers from advancing. What’s even more remarkable is that the resistance aims for victory over a well-trained, heavily equipped army with superior air control and firepower. By scientific comparison standards, the 2006 war serves as a near-ideal case study: a clash between the same forces, on the same land, and under similar conditions, with each side attempting to apply lessons from the past to improve their chances of winning.
• The occupier’s primary advancements have been in intelligence and security, as evidenced by the strikes it launched against the resistance’s leadership, infrastructure, and surrounding communities between September 17 and 27, 2024. These attacks were expected to serve as a final blow, capable of disabling the resistance’s missile launches and erode its ability on the ground, based on the belief that both are fundamentally tied to the resilience of its command and control systems. Although the attacks inflicted serious damage on the resistance, shaking its structure and undermining trust in its capabilities, this was temporary. The resistance quickly reasserted itself, regaining confidence among its local, regional, including Arabs, and international supporters, with even greater admiration for its resilience post-strike.
• In contrast, the weaknesses exposed in the 2006 war appear unresolved in the occupying army’s response today. Northern settlers fled their homes at the outset of this war rather than adhering to evacuation plans within fortified areas. The Iron Dome’s promised 90% effectiveness has failed to materialise, with its actual performance falling below half that mark. This shortfall, coupled with the resistance’s advanced missile and drone arsenal, proved lethal. While elite units of the occupying army were able to penetrate southern Lebanon in 2006, reaching Bint Jbeil and Wadi al-Hujair, in the current conflict they failed to breach the resistance’s defences and find themselves confronting resistance fighters who are more numerous, more efficient and better equipped.
• The resistance, has implemented significant, effective upgrades to its structure and tactics, and the intense strikes it endured have not impeded these enhancements. Short, medium, and long-range precision missiles demonstrated strategic effectiveness, achieving a powerful balance of deterrence in both range and destructive capacity and the ability to enforce displacement of the occupiers from their settlements. Drones, as a potent new force, have struck at the core of the occupying entity, creating both a conundrum and headache for their leadership, including one instance reaching Prime Minister Netanyahu’s bedroom, and another hitting a dining hall in the Binyamina base, injuring and killing nearly a hundred Golani Brigade officers and soldiers.
Meanwhile, thousands of resistance ground fighters have been armed, trained, and prepared with tunnels for manoeuvring, combat, and supplies, demonstrating extraordinary skill and preparation on the battlefield. These resistance fighters emerge in the battlefield as a highly efficient army – disrupting the presence of elite divisions, thus preventing the occupation army from achieving any success including in their ground operation.
• In the balance of firepower deterrence – an element absent in 2006 but now central – the resistance’s calculated escalation has sustained a powerful stance. This measured approach prevented the war from expanding to the capital, amid internal debate over establishing a support front. The resistance thus aims to contain the conflict within its sphere, yet deterrence remains robust, with scenarios like Tel Aviv versus Beirut, airport versus airport, port versus port, and electricity grid versus electricity grid reinforcing the balance. As the conflict persists, this dynamic exchange intensifies, bolstering the resistance’s presence and power.
• The war’s existential significance for the occupying entity arose from the Aqsa Flood events and the transition of its leadership to a coalition committed to war, expansion, and settlement. This backdrop provided both a rationale and a motive for enduring a prolonged conflict with heavy losses. In contrast, the resistance’s entry into the war to support Gaza initially weakened solidarity around its own cause, as it lost its strictly defensive posture. However, the toll on the occupying forces from a year of intense and open conflict in Gaza left them worn down as they moved to confront Lebanon. Meanwhile, the resistance’s stance, focused on a ceasefire and implementing Resolution 1701, helped it regain internal unity. As the occupying leadership raised its demands beyond Resolution 1701, seeking security arrangements reminiscent of the 1983 May 17 Agreement (overturned by the Lebanese resistance 40 years prior), the entity forfeited its initial international support, which had been premised solely on halting fire from Lebanon without additional conditions.
• Forty days into the major war between the resistance and the occupying forces, it can be said that the first ten days favoured the occupiers, with their deadly strikes from September 17 to 27. However, October and beyond have belonged entirely to the resistance. A new metric has emerged to gauge victory and defeat, surpassing mere firepower balance and mutual anxieties on both sides of the conflict. For the resistance, the focus is not on the scale of the occupiers’ firepower but on the impact of their own, which has often proven impressive – even astonishing. Conversely, for the occupying forces, the measure is not the expected scale of their own firepower, but their ability to suppress the resistance’s attacks, a task in which they repeatedly fall short. This sustained pattern points to a growing imbalance: failure for the occupiers, success for the resistance.
On the ground, even achieving a balance counts as a win for the resistance, as it signifies their success in preventing the large, well-trained occupying forces from making any breakthrough. Such a breakthrough has become essential for the occupiers to negotiate an end to rocket attacks and the return of displaced residents from northern occupied Palestine. Each failed attempt and the accompanying rising toll on their forces deplete the war’s chances of dragging on.
• Victory and defeat are measured by the level of confidence within the home front of both the resistance and the occupying forces. It’s clear that, though shaken in the ten intense early days, the resistance’s internal morale rebounded strongly and steadily, with talk of confidence in victory now rising with conviction. Meanwhile, doubts are mounting within the occupiers’ ranks about the value of prolonging a war that fails to halt the painful escalation in return. The prospect of ground advances appears increasingly difficult by the day, while the resistance instils growing hope of triumph within its own front and deepening despair within the occupiers’ about the purpose of continuing the fight.
