November 18, 2024
By Nasser Kandil
• From the discussions surrounding the draft agreement sent by U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein and Speaker Nabih Berri’s remarks about it, it appears that the proposal is grounded in UN Resolution 1701. It does not seem to legitimise violations of Lebanese airspace and waters, nor does it authorise ground intervention as the occupation entity had previously hoped for in earlier demands. However, lingering concerns arise from ambiguities rooted in three main issues.
• The first concern revolves around the mention of the “right to self-defence”, a right already guaranteed under the UN Charter. Its inclusion is therefore redundant and raises questions about intent – particularly the possibility of granting the occupation the authority to interpret when this right can be invoked. This would effectively allow any unilateral Israeli assessment of a perceived threat to justify aggression under the pretext of self-defence.
• The second concern lies in the proposed addition of a vague oversight committee operating outside the mechanisms of Resolution 1701. The rationale for imposing such a body, without a corresponding UN mandate, remains unclear. The concern is that its creation could pave the way for broadening the interpretation of resolution provisions, particularly regarding arms control and the sensitive issue of the Lebanese-Syrian border. This aligns with ongoing American and Israeli efforts to place the border under international oversight, as evidenced by recent military escalations against Syria. Such oversight could, in effect, extend to all of Lebanon – putting its south under Israeli supervision, its maritime domain under German oversight, and its eastern and northern borders under British control, while U.S. sponsorship of the Lebanese Army could morph into full-scale American oversight of Lebanon’s internal affairs.
• The third concern is related to dangerous and alarming reports of American guarantees to the occupying entity, allegedly providing the entity with favourable interpretations of the two ambiguous clauses. These guarantees could transform Lebanon’s agreement to Resolution 1701 into a verbal concession, enabling its implementation in a manner contrary to the resolution’s actual text.
• In all mediated agreements led by a third party, it is customary for the preamble to include a clause explicitly committing the mediator not to make secret promises or agreements with either side regarding the terms of the deal. The mediator should pledge that the only binding provisions are those explicitly stated in the agreement. Perhaps this is the missing line in Hochstein’s draft that must be added to ensure balance, transparency, and credibility in the mediation process.
