November 20, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• The developments surrounding the negotiations, including Amos Hochstein’s visit following the retreat from threats to cancel the visit in protest against Lebanese objections to the draft agreement – bear a striking resemblance to an incident from the 2006 war. At that time, the occupying entity’s ambassador to the UN made an unannounced visit to the suite of Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim in New York. The ambassador pleaded for an urgent ceasefire and acceptance of Lebanese conditions after Ehud Olmert, then Prime Minister of the occupying entity, reached out to U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Bolton to stop the war at any cost, even on terms favourable to Hezbollah. The driving force behind this desperation was the battlefield situation: soldiers deserting the frontlines, tanks being destroyed, mounting casualties, and a lack of options to change the course of the war. Could history be repeating itself now, with even graver consequences?
• More than 50 days have passed since the ground operation including its two stages began, and over two months since the all-out war on Lebanon commenced. Despite the immense losses suffered by both the resistance and Lebanon, the past month has marked a clear shift in momentum in favour of the resistance. On the ground, the resistance has uncontested control, and its firepower dominance grows daily. The destruction inflicted by the occupation army fails to alter the balance of power. The resistance’s support base remains steadfast, the Lebanese state refuses to compromise sovereignty for a ceasefire, and the resistance itself fights as if the war has just begun, with no shortage of resolve or strategy.
Whereas the latest battlefield reports reveal entire elite occupation units abandoning their positions, from Khiyam to Aytaroun and Shama. Meanwhile, among the settlers, frustration over military failures and shattered promises of a crushing war on Lebanon has reached a boiling point. The resistance’s firepower extended from Kiryat Shmona to Haifa, and most recently to the heart of Tel Aviv.
• Breaking the morale of the occupation’s army including it’s internal front is a strategic goal, which appears to be succeeding. This desperation explains the unusual American approach. When the occupying entity is strong, the U.S. comes to dictate conditions, and when they don’t receive a suitable response, they quickly walk away and do not return unless the conditions are ripe. But in times of Israeli defeat and weakness, Washington assumes and markets the role of a mediator, seeking to halt the war while slipping in concessions between the lines for the occupier.
• No one is privy to the specific details of ongoing discussions between Speaker Nabih Berri and Hochstein, but their mutual optimism suggests significant progress. It seems Hochstein aims to finalise matters before heading to the occupying entity, not because of American altruism, or because its crippled and Zionist administration or its president-elect would apply pressure on the entity’s leaders to stop the war, but due to a pressing need to salvage what remains of the situation.
Berri’s unwavering stance, rooted in decades of resistance to external pressures, ensures that no compromise will be made on sovereignty or the rights of the resistance. The occupying entity’s reluctance to adhere to UN Resolution 1701 for 18 years – while preserving provocations like the occupation of Shebaa Farms and daily airspace violations – has come back to haunt it.
Berri is the same leader who spearheaded the uprising against the May 17 Agreement forty years ago – a deal that demanded concessions similar to those being proposed today. However, at that time, the situation was far more dire: the occupation’s military forces were at the gates of Beirut, there was significant American influence within Lebanon, and joint American-Israeli dominance over the Lebanese state was overwhelming. The resistance was far weaker than it is today, and its ability to endure came at a much higher cost yet Berri secured a political victory in 2006 under these less favourable circumstances. It should be obvious that what Berri refused to accept then, he will not accept now.
• As Speaker Berri often reminds “don’t count your chickens before they hatch”, thus we await verification of whether the occupying entity has conceded to withdrawing from Lebanese territories and ceasing its violations of Lebanese airspace – ending it’s 18 year long violations of Lebanese sovereignty which consequently failure to secure the withdrawal of the resistance’s organised units and heavy weaponry from south of the Litani River. The occupiers perceived their daily violations of Lebanese airspace and control of strategic locations like Shebaa Farms as essential conditions for maintaining leverage and preparing for a future war, even years down the line. These strategic footholds hold far greater significance than any symbolic media narrative about the resistance withdrawing its forces and arms. Moreover, the occupier fully recognizes that the dynamics have fundamentally changed since 2006. Armed with missiles capable of reaching deep into its territory, the resistance has reshaped the rules of engagement in a profound and decisive way. But will the occupiers conclude that this is their last war on Lebanon?
• Should the current anticipated developments materialise, they would represent a historic victory for the resistance. Such an outcome would not only secure national gains for Lebanon but also close the chapter on the occupation’s wars. Moreover, it could open the door to a long-overdue national dialogue on a comprehensive defence strategy. The resistance’s critics, both domestic and foreign, would be forced to confront the issue of arming the Lebanese Army with effective defensive capabilities, starting with an air defence network – an outcome the U.S. fears more than the resistance’s own weapons, as it would create a permanent deterrent against the occupying entity that cannot be undone. In contrast, the resistance’s armament is a more fluid matter, subject to shifting circumstances, with regional developments potentially restricting it or legitimising aggression against it.
• Ultimately, the current trajectory hinges on the collapse of the occupying army. If it falters in Lebanon, it is unlikely to muster the strength to confront Gaza, where the challenges are even more formidable. A crumbling army cannot pivot from one war to launch another.
