November 28, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• The Lebanese government has released the official text of the ceasefire agreement between Lebanon and the occupying entity, allowing for a clear and thorough analysis. This move comes as a counter to the calculated misinformation campaigns by the occupying entity’s leaders and media, which sought to misrepresent the agreement. These efforts aimed to create a narrative that suggested gains for the occupying army, concessions on Lebanese sovereignty, and additional restrictions on the resistance beyond those stipulated in Resolution 1701. This context sets the stage for a critical question: who truly emerged victorious in this war?
• At its core, the agreement can be seen as an updated version of Resolution 1701, which remains the foundation of its terms. Some may point to clauses about restricting the resistance, such as dismantling infrastructure and prohibiting armed groups. However, it’s important to understand that these provisions are directly carried over from Resolution 1701, where they were initially presented with a stronger tone and broader application across all Lebanese territories. In contrast, the new agreement focuses its jurisdiction south of the Litani River, narrowing its scope significantly.
This shift is not accidental. The resistance’s strength, especially its decisive show of force on November 24, played a pivotal role. That display left the occupying entity with no choice but to accept the agreement after rejecting it twice. This is the same force that was built, developed, and firmly established within the framework of Resolution 1701, which underscores that the repeated clauses from Resolution 1701 do not meaningfully alter the resistance’s ability to operate or build its capacity.
• Three critical factors have historically undermined efforts to restrict the resistance under Resolution 1701. Without addressing these, the current agreement is unlikely to achieve stricter enforcement than what has been seen over the past 18 years.
The first factor is the absence of an independent operational mandate for UNIFIL forces. Over the years, there have been repeated attempts to amend UNIFIL’s powers to allow it to act independently of the Lebanese Army, but these efforts consistently failed. The occupying entity’s Prime Minister Netanyahu had hoped this agreement would establish a U.S.-led supervisory committee with accompanying American forces to oversee security south of the Litani River. This explains Israeli enthusiasm and focus on the area south of the Litani River. To such an extent, one could interpret the agreement, – when compared to Resolution 1701, as implicitly granting the resistance the freedom to construct infrastructure and establish armed frameworks north of the Litani. This remains the case until Lebanon devises a national defense strategy to address the issue of the resistance’s weapons – an effort hindered by a critical barrier. The U.S. and Western powers continue to prevent the Lebanese Army from acquiring the advanced weaponry necessary to defend Lebanon against Israeli ambitions and aggressions.
Thanks to the balance of power on the ground and the steadfastness of Lebanese negotiators, all attempts to establish such a committee to address violations of Resolution 1701 and manage security south of the Litani as a substitute for the Lebanese state and its army have ultimately failed. Similarly, efforts to deploy American forces in the region have been decisively thwarted. Both matters are now conclusively settled: the committee retains only an advisory role, modeled on its predecessor from the April 1996 Understanding, and no American forces will be introduced.
Israeli media reports that these outcomes angered Netanyahu. However, the battlefield dynamics, especially after Sunday’s events and the status of his forces, is what ultimately compelled him to accept the agreement.
• The second factor is the failure to internationalise the Lebanese-Syrian border, an objective tied to Resolution 1680 and referenced in Resolution 1701. Such internationalisation would have required – in addition to Lebanon’s agreement, either Syria’s agreement or a Chapter VII mandate from the United Nations, neither of which materialised. This failure means there is no effective mechanism to restrict the resistance’s movement, or its ability to acquire weapons and develop infrastructure in the border areas.
• The third and most critical factor lies in the ongoing violations of Lebanese sovereignty by the occupying entity. Despite the explicit calls in Resolution 1701 for respecting Lebanese sovereignty, including the withdrawal from the Lebanese side of Ghajar village – occupied since 2006, the entity continues violating UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 425. The proposal presented by the United Nations Secretary-General – Ban Ki-moon – includes placing the Shebaa Farms under UNIFIL’s custodianship, pending the implementation of Resolution 242, which the occupier envisions places the farms within its jurisdiction. Lebanon accepted this interim proposal of UNIFIL jurisdiction, but the occupying entity rejected it.
The continued Israeli operations in Lebanese airspace and the occupation of the Shebaa Farms – are breaches that the U.S. and Western nations have approached in much the same way they justified the occupation’s annexation of the Golan Heights – framing them as necessary for Israeli security priorities. These violations render any attempts to restrict the resistance’s arsenal or presence nothing more than an unlawful bias in favor of the occupying entity – a stance that would be nearly impossible to justify, even to the resistance’s most ardent critics within Lebanon. The underlying pretext of Israeli “security needs” serves only one clear purpose: preparing for another war against Lebanon.
• The occupying entity sought to secure a clause granting freedom of action in Lebanon under the pretext of countering threats posed by the resistance to its security. However, this attempt was thwarted through the strength of the battlefield and the resilience of the Lebanese negotiator.
• The resulting clause now enshrines the right to self-defense for both Lebanon and the occupying entity in accordance with international law and under the framework of Resolution 1701. Consequently, the text lost the strategic function Netanyahu had intended for it.
We are now faced with an agreement that is precariously balanced: it could either reignite the conflict if the occupying entity fails to uphold its obligations toward Lebanese sovereignty or remain frozen at the level of mutual non-implementation, as happened during the initial attempt to apply Resolution 1701. The question is whether or not the entity will engage reckless behavior driven by the illusion of victory leading to reigniting the war.
• The resistance is fully prepared for any of these scenarios, all of which, incidentally, serve to strengthen Gaza’s position. A return to escalation would revive direct fire support, while adherence to commitments reinforces Lebanon’s sovereignty. Even a freeze in implementation would introduce a novel form of support, leveraging the strength of precedent to set an example that could inspire and pave the way for similar outcomes in Gaza.
