December 03, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• The impact of the ceasefire agreement on the resistance’s supporters across the region and its political front vastly differs from its reception within the occupying entity’s public opinion and political landscape. On one side, there were jubilant celebrations of a great victory among displaced individuals returning to southern Lebanon, despite the widespread destruction. This joy emerged even before any official calls for their return. Similarly, resistance forces in Palestine, particularly in Gaza, welcomed the agreement, expressing gratitude and admiration for the sacrifices made by the Lebanese resistance in favor of Gaza and Palestine.
This demonstrates that, despite the horrific scale of destruction inflicted by the occupation on Lebanon, the strength and effectiveness of the resistance – whether in drone and missile strikes or its legendary ground resilience – earned widespread respect. The occupation’s strategy of deterrence through destruction failed to weaken the morale of the resistance’s supporters or to alienate them from the resistance. Instead, it fortified their resolve, leaving the occupation bitterly disappointed.
• In tandem, regional resistance forces showed solidarity with their Lebanese counterpart, celebrating what they deemed a significant victory and framing it as a stepping stone toward a broader triumph for Gaza. This reaction was not mere lip service; Gaza’s resistance factions genuinely believed that the Lebanese front’s firepower had achieved its objective of exhausting the occupation’s army and compelling it to accept a ceasefire without reaching its goals. They reasoned that prolonging the firepower from Lebanon would not halt the massacres in Gaza, while Gaza’s resistance could continue depleting the occupation’s resources on its own. However, the sheer intensity of the war in Lebanon drew the spotlight away from Gaza’s plight, causing global and domestic movements pressing for a prisoner exchange deal and an end to the war to lose momentum. Protests – that once drew half a million participants in the occupying entity before the Lebanon war – have ceased. Similarly, global public opinion, which had gained momentum, particularly in Western universities before the start of the academic year, has not regained its vibrancy. The prevailing belief is that the ceasefire in Lebanon reflects the entity’s acknowledgment of its inability to continue the war and its failure to achieve its objectives.
The renewed global focus on Gaza’s plight in the media and public advocacy efforts, underscore the effectiveness of the resistance’s actions against the occupier in Gaza. These factors are accelerating the chances of reaching an agreement acceptable to the resistance in Gaza, making the resistance’s genuine welcome of the ceasefire a reflection of its calculated assessment.
• In Lebanon, the occupation lost both the battle for public opinion and the cohesion among resistance forces. Within the entity, the fallout was even harsher. Netanyahu’s attempt to frame the ceasefire as a victory failed to resonate with the public, deepening political divisions and intensifying calls to expedite a Gaza deal. Critics likened Netanyahu to Ehud Olmert, whom he ousted for perceived failures in Lebanon. The initial euphoria following the entity’s deadly strikes on the resistance has dissipated, with Israeli media describing the mood as a blanket of gloom over public opinion. Adding to his isolation, northern settlers refused to return to their homes, leaving Netanyahu cornered by internal dissent, public disillusionment, and unresolved challenges on multiple fronts.
• The occupation’s violations of the ceasefire agreement, which outwardly resemble those seen after the July 2006 war that continued for fifty days, differ significantly in substance. These breaches appear more like political and military maneuvers aimed at imposing an interpretation of the ceasefire contrary to the agreement’s terms.
The intent seems to be transforming the ceasefire into a unilateral cessation of hostilities by the resistance while maintaining a form of ongoing conflict akin to the “battles between wars” strategy employed on the Syrian front. This approach serves dual purposes: projecting an image of strength to the entity’s internal audience and establishing a new deterrence equation for Lebanon and its resistance.
Moreover, it seeks to condition a full cessation of hostilities on achieving security control over Lebanon, preventing the rebuilding of resistance capabilities through relentless pursuit across Lebanese territory and along the Lebanese-Syrian border. The goal is to secure concrete agreements that achieve this objective, rather than leaving it as a conditional promise reliant on the occupying entity’s commitments – such as withdrawal from occupied territories, halting violations of Lebanese airspace, or linking the future of the resistance’s weapons to the creation of a capable Lebanese army capable of countering the occupier’s military aggression and violations.
• Lebanon, however, countered these violations with patience and adherence to the agreement, gaining international acknowledgment of Israel’s breaches. Statements from U.S. and French officials warning that the agreement was at risk due to Israeli violations, coupled with the Lebanese resistance’s warnings, presented Netanyahu with a stark choice: return to a war that Lebanon does not seek – but finds less burdensome than the terms the entity is imposing – or fully commit to the agreement, which Lebanon is committed to fulfilling.
• Netanyahu must now weigh his desire to escape the bitter taste of defeat against the realities that forced him into the ceasefire: an exhausted army incapable of prolonging the war and a fragile home front unable to endure further resistance strikes. His decision will define whether the ceasefire holds, at least minimally, or whether he plunges into another round of devastating conflict, possibly more severe than before.
