December 04, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Many observers, both supporters and opponents of Syria, view the current scene in Syria through the lens of 2011 – frozen in the dynamics, alliances, and calculations. They interpret today’s developments as an extension of that era, ignoring the profound global, regional, and internal transformations that have rendered the present scene a chapter of dark comedy, devoid of strategic or political significance and doomed to failure. The world of 2024 is vastly different from that of 2011 – globally, regionally, and within Syria itself.
• On the global stage, 2011 marked a critical juncture as the United States tested the limits of its soft power while grappling with the aftermath of failures in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Lebanon (2006), and Gaza (2008). By 2016-2018, however, the tide had turned decisively. The victories of Syria’s defenders – from Aleppo to Deir ez-Zor, and extending to Ghouta, Damascus, southern Syria, and the countryside of Homs and Hama – reshaped the trajectory of the war. As the U.S.’s soft power waned, the Astana process gained prominence. Turkey, once a key driver of the war on Syria, shifted to political maneuvering with Syria’s allies, ultimately seeking reconciliation with Syria and its president. Consequently, fear mongering about a Trump presidency or the leadership of reformists in Iran is baseless, as the transformative events of 2016-2018 unfolded during Trump’s tenure and while reformists held the presidency in Iran.
• Attempts to argue that the Ukraine war has weakened Russia, or that Gaza and Lebanon’s confrontations with the occupying entity undermine Syria’s strength, are flawed misreadings of reality. Russia’s involvement in Ukraine is rooted in its global position, a value it rediscovered in Syria and stands to lose without it. Similarly, Iran and the resistance forces have inflicted such damage on the occupying entity that it was compelled to accept a ceasefire in Lebanon after escalating its objectives to existential proportions, only to retreat into uneasy coexistence with a heavily armed and resolute resistance. Both Russia and Iran have tasted victory in Syria, and neither requires further persuasion to recognise Syria’s pivotal role in their strategic security, a realisation cemented between 2011 and 2015.
• The Arab states, once deeply entangled in Syria’s war – through financing, arming factions, issuing religious decrees, amplifying media narratives, and mobilising volunteers and mercenaries, ultimately stripping Syria of its seat in the Arab League, have experienced profound transformations. Today, shaken by the events in Gaza and their collective utter failure to assert meaningful roles, these states have reinstated Syria’s Arab League membership and appear compelled to abandon reckless endeavors, avoiding a repeat of the absurdities of 2011. Instead, they now gravitate toward political and media alignment with Syria. It is clear that the hostility toward Iran and the ill-fated “Deal of the Century” are relics of the past. These shifts however stand in stark contrast to the desires of those who seek Arab endorsement for campaigns like the assault on Aleppo.
• Within Syria and across the Arab public, new awareness has emerged post the Arab Spring. The deceptions of outlets like Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, which swayed many in 2011, are no longer easily replicated. The Arab Spring revolutions culminated in disasters, and the opposition forces that once operated in secrecy have been exposed as unfit for governance, leaving many nostalgic for the regimes they replaced. Syrians, too, came to see the so-called revolution as a front for Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, Turkish ambitions, and Arab hostility driven by Syria’s honorable stance on Palestine. They realised that their state alone guarantees territorial unity, sovereignty, and coexistence. Those who needed time in 2011 to form their own narratives about Syria now see clearly, standing firmly where they believe their country is safeguarded from fragmentation.
• The Gaza war has added a defining frame to the Syrian scene. Turkey, a primary backer of Nusra Front fighters, maintains relations with the occupying entity, unlike nations such as Colombia and Bolivia, which severed ties over Gaza’s massacres. Qatar, home to the region’s largest U.S. military base, expelled Hamas leaders, admitting that it hosted them only at Washington’s request. Meanwhile, Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran – the very forces targeted by the Aleppo assault – remain the foremost enemies of the occupying entity. It takes little reflection to recognise that the assault on Aleppo was merely compensation for Israel’s inability to continue its war in southern Lebanon.
• The battle to reclaim territories seized during the Aleppo campaign may not happen tomorrow, but the historical and political trajectory of current events points unmistakably toward one outcome: the crowning of Syria’s past victories with a broader triumph, paving the way for territorial unification and full sovereignty.
