December 12, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Turkey currently appears to be the biggest beneficiary of the shifts in Syria. It has secured a project it pursued relentlessly for over a decade, risking economic, political, and military alliances along the way. In 2015, Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet over Syria pushed its ties with Moscow to the brink of war, and NATO – a key alliance for Turkey – failed to offer support. Later, Turkey angered the U.S. by strengthening its relationship with Russia after the Astana Agreement, even appearing at times as part of a Russian-Iranian axis. Now, Turkey has pivoted back to the U.S., straining its ties with Moscow and Tehran, but emerging as the chief sponsor of Syria’s political, economic, and military reconstruction. Syria offers Turkey an unparalleled gateway to regional influence, but can Ankara truly claim victory after such high-stakes risks?
• Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, implicitly criticized Turkey without naming it, accusing the “neighboring state” of colluding with Washington and Tel Aviv in a conspiracy targeting Syria and the Iranian-led resistance axis. Russian political thinker Alexander Dugin, close to the Kremlin, has signaled a looming reckoning with Turkey, holding it accountable for betraying its Russian and Iranian allies. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent speeches conspicuously avoid mentioning these two nations, which were until recently pivotal partners.
• Economically, Turkey’s ties with Russia and Iran are based on mutual interests. Moscow and Tehran had granted Ankara preferential terms, especially in energy pricing and payment structures, helping Turkey weather its economic crises – crises Erdogan himself admitted were a key factor in his party’s waning influence during the last parliamentary elections. A chasm of this magnitude will certainly lead to what can be described as a political divorce. While efforts may be made to shield economic interests from political fallout, the political incentives underpinning these advantages will inevitably disappear.
• Turkey’s repositioning in terms of its political geography comes at a time of global uncertainty, where it is no longer possible to speak of a stable international balance of power. The U.S. is increasingly constrained in its ability to wage wars despite its technological and intelligence superiority, facing fierce Russian competition in Europe that extends beyond Ukraine, and an Iranian challenge in the region that cannot be underestimated and defies military resolution. A war involving global oil supplies, U.S. bases, and strategic waterways would almost certainly trigger economic collapse. For Russia and Iran, retreating behind their borders and stepping back from the Syrian conflict, given conditions that prevent their victory, may strengthen their capacity for defence.
• Realistically, Turkey’s positioning comes at a time of American ambiguity regarding regional equations, particularly concerning the future of relations with the armed Kurdish groups. For Turkey, stability in Syria will not be achievable without resolving the status of its forces and securing its control over a portion of Syrian territory. It seems that Washington’s strategy hinges on two set priorities: restoring some semblance of “Israeli” strength after the setbacks in Gaza and Lebanon, and negotiating with Iran from a position of strength as an alternative to a costly war. For the U.S., the Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria are critical to these objectives, outweighing the need to placate Turkey. American and “Israeli” support for Kurdish autonomy is evident, from “Israeli” discourse on northern and southern belts to high-profile U.S. military visits to Kurdish-controlled territories as well as supporting statements by the U.S. secretary of defence.
• If Turkey fails to unify Syria under its influence, it will face domestic and regional repercussions. Kurdish issues would resurface as a major challenge, and Syria could become a security and economic burden. Turkey, as the purported sponsor of a new Syria, would face daily embarrassment from continued “Israeli” airstrikes, which undermine its position. How will Ankara manage such disappointments, especially if relations with Iran and Russia deteriorate further?
Turkey’s high-stakes maneuvers in Syria have yielded a momentary advantage, but its long-term position remains precarious. Whether Ankara’s gambit ultimately pays off depends on its ability to navigate these mounting challenges.
