December 16, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• The scene captured from the Aqaba meeting, where the foreign ministers of states convened to discuss Syria’s new reality, speaks volumes. Turkey’s Foreign Minister passionately addresses his Saudi counterpart, who looks away, seemingly disinterested. This image reflects the dynamics of supply and demand in the political marketplace post-Syrian upheaval, between two major players vying for leadership of the Muslim world’s majority demographic: Turkey, with its Ottoman ambitions, and Saudi Arabia, the custodian of wealth, oil, and the holy sites. Who needs the other more?
• Turkey has taken the reins in Syria and must now ensure the success of this endeavor. This requires confronting challenges and paying prices. The first challenge stems from the overt U.S. commitment to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which the Turkish foreign minister has labeled a threat to Turkey’s national security, insisting that coexistence with an armed SDF is impossible. Meanwhile, Washington persists in legitimising the SDF militarily and economically, leveraging oil and gas resources in areas under its control and pushing for a federal constitutional framework that secures these interests – akin to a confederal model.
• Alongside the Kurdish challenge is the Israeli one. Israel’s expansionist ambitions hold greater weight with Washington than Turkey’s concerns. Israel views the current phase as ripe for capitalising on open maneuvers in Syria, aiming to compensate for setbacks in Gaza and Lebanon. It seeks to cement its role in shaping Syria’s future by promoting a Druze state in the south and a Kurdish state in the north, or at the very least, a federal structure that guarantees autonomous entities with distinct identities. This fragmentation threatens to dissolve any notion of a unified Syrian state, raising the question: who will dare confront the Syrian majority, which considers its victory tied to accepting a diminished state devoid of northern and coastal resources?
• Turkey’s reliance on U.S. goodwill is unavoidable, given America’s position as a NATO ally and its imposition of sanctions on Syria. Without lifting these sanctions, any state in Syria will remain crippled and incapable of revival. Moreover, the central force in Turkey’s Syrian project remains on the U.S. terrorism list, necessitating its removal – a cost that begins with Kurdish concessions and ends with Israeli terms. Can Turkey bear these costs? How will Erdogan justify to his Turkish audience the legitimisation of a fully armed, funded Kurdish entity or Israel’s unchecked activities in territories Turkey claims to have brought under its influence?
• Turkey is no longer geographically distant from occupied Palestine. Amid developments in Palestine and Hamas’s support for Turkey and the Syrian changes, what narrative will Erdogan adopt on the Palestinian cause? Turkey may dream of presenting itself to the Muslim world as the leader that secured a state for Palestinians. Yet, neither Washington nor Tel Aviv is inclined to entertain Ankara’s ambitions. If a Palestinian state ever materialises under U.S. auspices, it will likely be a price paid to Saudi Arabia in exchange for Saudi-Israeli normalisation. Despite its significance, Tel Aviv’s leaders remain unwilling to discuss the idea. So, what will Erdogan say about Palestine?
• Saudi Arabia is crucial for Turkey – not as a means to lower Erdogan’s embarrassment over Palestine but for Syria’s reconstruction. Turkish companies, as in Libya, are counting on Saudi financing. Yet the key to unlocking Saudi cooperation remains elusive. Saudi Arabia, concerned about the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt via Turkey’s influence in Libya, is even more apprehensive about Turkish expansion in Syria and its potential impact on Egypt and Jordan. Any Saudi contribution to Syria’s rebuilding will hinge on ensuring Turkey gains no leverage for Islamic world leadership. Unlike Iran, whose Shiite identity limits its regional ambitions, Turkey’s Ottoman identity aligns with the Sunni majority over which Saudi Arabia claims leadership. While Iran’s influence is tied to its narrow sectarian base, Turkey’s ambitions rest on the global Muslim Brotherhood network, widespread across the Islamic world.
• The U.S. needs Saudi Arabia more than Turkey. Saudi Arabia is unopposed to a federal Syria, with Kurdish autonomy at its core, and remains pivotal for U.S. objectives. Washington views Saudi-Israeli normalisation as the linchpin for legitimising the occupation entity’s future. Saudi Arabia is also the strategic partner for the India-Middle East-Europe corridor, which aims to replace China’s Silk Road. This corridor’s path to Haifa depends on Saudi Arabia, as does its commercial viability. Moreover, the proposed Qatari gas pipeline and Gulf oil routes to Europe via Syria and Turkey – envisioned as an alternative to Russian energy – can only materialise with Saudi approval, as the pipeline must traverse its territory.
• Turkey must transition from being a sought-after player to one seeking Saudi partnership in all unresolved files. Without such cooperation, Turkey risks eroding the perceived strength of its neo-Ottoman project. The image of Turkey’s foreign minister engaging with his Saudi counterpart resembles that of a salesman courting a wealthy but dismissive customer.
