December 30, 2024
Nasser Kandil
• Many Turkish analysts are currently exploring the U.S. stance on the Turkish and Israeli projects, particularly in light of the major geopolitical shifts in Syria. These changes have caused regional and international reverberations, with Turkey playing a central role in shaping them. Turkish commentators express frustration in Ankara over what they perceive as American and Israeli ingratitude for Turkey’s achievements, which have yielded benefits for both Washington and Tel Aviv without incurring costs. These include removing a regime that the U.S. and Israel repeatedly declared they wanted to topple but lacked a roadmap to achieve, weakening Russia’s presence in West Asia, ousting Iran from Syria, and cutting Hezbollah’s supply lines via Syria. Ankara had anticipated American and Israeli approval of Turkey’s expected gains, such as resolving the armed Kurdish issue in eastern Syria, lifting sanctions on Syria, delisting Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from terrorist organisations, and creating favorable conditions for a new Turkey-backed regime. However, Washington and Tel Aviv seem to have reaped their benefits and now aim to extort Turkey at every turn. Ankara perceives Israeli activities in southern Syria, including strikes on Syrian military assets, as deliberate provocations meant to embarrass the new Syrian leadership and weaken its image domestically. This is particularly sensitive given the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, which Tel Aviv, with Washington’s support, has declared annexed. Moreover, U.S. statements on sanctions and Kurdish armed groups suggest developments are not aligning with Ankara’s expectations.
• Turkish officials suggest Ankara is waiting for President Donald Trump to assume office to test his apparent endorsement of Turkey’s role in Syria. They are particularly concerned about whether this extends to Kurdish armed groups and the U.S. military presence in Syria, as indicated by Trump’s previous statements. Ankara’s anxiety stems from two factors: first, anticipated resistance from Washington’s deep state, especially the Pentagon, advocating for an increased U.S. presence in Syria and maintaining Kurdish armed groups’ autonomy, potentially mirroring Iraq’s federal structure with Kurdish control over oil resources. Second, Ankara fears Trump’s prioritisation of Israeli interests might solidify Israeli expansion into southern Syria and support for Kurdish military structures as strategic assets for Tel Aviv. This could include further territorial expansion under the guise of Israel’s security needs, as Trump has previously endorsed Israel’s territorial aspirations.
Ankara is also wary of U.S. demands linking the lifting of sanctions and delisting HTS to stringent conditions, potentially subjugating both Ankara and Damascus. Turkish officials assert that Ankara will not capitulate, having invested heavily in its Syrian campaign. Consequently, Turkey has begun sending conciliatory signals to Moscow and Tehran through the Syrian leadership to counter potential American shifts.
– Analysts in Washington doubt that delisting HTS as a terrorist organisation will be straightforward, given its designation through the United Nations, which tied it to human rights violations and legal cases that cannot be ignored. Moreover, lifting sanctions is contingent on this delisting, as sanctions imposed for human rights violations cannot be removed while the ruling entity remains designated as terrorist. The U.S. reiterates the requirements of its sanctions framework, including implementing UN Resolution 2254, advancing women’s rights, ensuring representation of all Syrian components in governance, holding parliamentary and presidential elections under a new constitution, and now the added condition of removing the terrorist designation from the ruling governing body. If constitutional and electoral reforms may take up to four years – as the ruling governing body’s leader has indicated – then removing the terrorist designation will not come any sooner. It is preferable that such a request comes from an elected government representing all segments of the Syrian people, including a significant Kurdish representation.
– In Tel Aviv, there is a solid commitment to maintaining freedom of movement in Syria, extending to the outskirts of Damascus, and control over Mount Hermon and its surrounding highlands, deemed essential to “Israel’s” security. This ambition aligns with the longstanding military doctrine viewing the Golan Heights as the state’s strategic vantage point – its eyes, ears and vital lifeline. The occupying entity previously shared control of the heights with the Syrian state with this dual presence causing a constant state of unease for the entity. However, now that monopolising control over the heights has become possible, there is no turning back. Nothing can obstruct this project including turning the Hauran plain into a buffer zone – even if that means displacing thousands of residents of villages and towns.
– All these developments suggest that the honeymoon period between the Turkish, American, and Israeli trio in Syria, which ends on January 8, may not be renewed. The competing visions of Tel Aviv’s “Greater Israel” and Ankara’s “New Ottomanism” seem increasingly incompatible.
