January 03, 2025
By Nasser Kandil
• Many writers and analysts frequently speak of Lebanon’s need for a “strong president” capable of building the state beyond the framework of sectarian quotas. Such calls are often tied to the nomination of the army commander for the presidency, regardless of the changing names over time.
• Advocates of this view, however, fail to provide a clear definition of what constitutes a “strong president”, a concept that was widely debated during the tenure of President Michel Aoun. Yet, the notion of strength remained ambiguous, as under the Taif Agreement, the president does not rule but rather manages governance and the mechanisms of decision-making. How, then, can strength manifest other than through the administration of national consensus – a type of strength that proponents of the “strong president” dismiss as weakness?
• If the idea of a strong president is not exemplified by Michel Aoun’s tenure – evidenced by the inability to fulfill aspirations and promises despite the Free Patriotic Movement holding the largest parliamentary bloc, the largest ministerial coalition, and appointing key state officials – then what is this strength supposed to mean? If it is not about fostering dialogue and seeking consensus, what else could it be?
• The implicit meaning of a “strong president” seems to hinge on securing external support that enables the president to bypass Lebanon’s internal dynamics. This external backing would manufacture consensus in favor of imposing the president’s authority on all Lebanese, coercively, through foreign pressure that guarantees the success of the presidential term.
Lebanon has experienced this notion of a “strong president” in two distinct eras. The first was during the post-Israeli invasion period when the Taif Agreement was absent, granting the president the power to decide and govern. However, the president and his party’s rule at the time resulted in a renewed civil war instead of ending it. The second instance was under President Emile Lahoud, who enjoyed extraordinary Syrian support. Despite this, the experiment failed to build the state, leading to national turmoil, starting with the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and culminating in the July 2006 war.
• Most Lebanese sects outside the president’s sect express apprehension over the idea of a strong president which simultaneously insists on the presidency remaining within the same sect, and controlling positions like the army commander, the central bank governor, and the president of the Supreme Judicial Council – granting dominance over military, financial, and judicial authorities. Meanwhile, political figures from the president’s own sect often fear the concept of a strong president, worrying it might result in the elimination of political plurality within their sect as a prerequisite for asserting strength.
• Perhaps this is why, during the French Mandate, attempts were made to avoid nominating Maronite candidates for the presidency, opting instead for figures like Charles Debbas, an Orthodox Christian, Ayoub Tabet, a Protestant, and Petro Trad, another Orthodox Christian.
