January 04, 2025
By Nasser Kandil
• The Kurdish issue remains the crux of international and regional intersections in the Syrian equation. Turkish President Recep Erdogan has made no secret of his insistence on dismantling the Syrian Democratic Forces , disarming them, and ending the Kurdish canton established under U.S. protection in northeastern Syria. On the other side, Western powers – led by Washington and Paris – continue to support their Kurdish ally, with Tel Aviv quietly backing the preservation of this arrangement.
• The recent U.S. and European moves toward Syria present a dual proposition: lifting sanctions on one hand and building a participatory civil state in Syria on the other, grounded in a consensual civil constitution and credible free elections. The West appears to condition this process on the extent of Kurdish participation in the transitional phase, whether in forming a new military, drafting a new constitution, or shaping the interim government.
• At first glance, this new Western approach seems to align with Erdogan’s demand to dismantle Kurdish military and economic autonomy. However, the price of achieving this might be more challenging than the current status quo. Ankara’s vision for a “new Syria”, which it seeks to expedite through cooperation with the current government in Damascus, hinges on monopolising control. This includes a faction-based military under Turkish supervision, a one-color government managing border negotiations, a single-colored constitutional committee, and a national dialogue conference tightly controlled and preordained in objectives and outcomes.
• Ankara now faces a difficult decision: It could opt for a Turkey-controlled but isolated administration that preserves its singular Turkish vision. However, this would entail remaining under sanctions. Such a path would likely hinder Turkey’s ability to extend control over Syrian territories – north and south – and complicate its future influence in other areas.
Alternatively, Turkey could accept a political framework where it shares influence within a system that includes significant internal components, such as armed factions with essential geographic influence and external ties. These entities would balance Turkish dominance as a prerequisite for establishing a single, yet ununified nation – but at least a viable state that is economically sustainable and politically recognised.
This latter option, however, comes with its own costs requiring precise calculations because Turkey’s long-standing reliance on armed factions under its sponsorship over the past decade could fracture. Some factions might oppose the idea of a civil state, possibly breaking away to seize control over parts of Syrian territory and declaring open rebellion against Turkey’s strategy.
