January 06, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• Since the emergence of the resistance after 1982, led initially by the Amal Movement in southern Lebanon, Washington has sought ways to neutralise this resistance – alternating between enticement, intimidation, and siege tactics. Until Hezbollah emerged as the new face of the resistance post-Taif Agreement, U.S. efforts faced a recurring obstacle: President Nabih Berri’s leadership successfully bridged two critical roles. He simultaneously led the resistance and spearheaded the Shiite community’s integration into Lebanon’s state framework after decades of marginalisation and exclusion. Thus, any attempt to weaken the resistance inevitably risked marginalising the Shiite community itself, a move tantamount to igniting a civil war with no clear victor. The February 6, 1984 uprising, led by Berri in response to President Amin Gemayel’s civil war project to solidify the U.S.-backed May 17 Agreement, demonstrated this. The conflict, centered in the Mountain, Beirut’s southern suburbs, and the capital itself, revealed to the Americans that civil war – even under U.S. patronage – would fracture the Lebanese army and state rather than consolidate them.
• When Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah emerged as the leader of Hezbollah, a deep understanding developed between Hezbollah and Amal, resulting in a full partnership in resistance and governance. Berri led the political participation in the state, while Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah managed the armed resistance. The Americans shifted strategy, attempting to court Amal and isolate Hezbollah. Yet, the Nasrallah-Berri duo turned this gambit into a coordinated division of roles, with the U.S. repeatedly misreading their unity. This dynamic became evident during the 2006 July War when Sayyed Nasrallah led the resistance effort for both Hezbollah and Amal, while Berri managed the negotiations. At one point, the U.S. believed it had convinced Berri to allow the Lebanese Army into the South without Hezbollah’s consent. However, it was later revealed that this arrangement had been pre-negotiated between Berri and Nasrallah.
• Post-2006, the U.S. invested heavily in attempts to fracture Shiite unity, pouring funds into creating opposition within the Shiite community against the Amal-Hezbollah partnership. Despite these efforts, every electoral challenge failed. Any Shiite parliamentary seat won outside the bloc often relied on non-Shiite voters – Sunni or Christian – rendering the winner perceived within the Shiite community as a representative of another sect rather than their own.
• During the al-Alqsa flood War and the support front, U.S. strategies faced a resilient Amal-Hezbollah partnership and a massive popular wave backing their positions. Even President Joe Biden acknowledged repeatedly that any ceasefire in Lebanon was contingent on developments in Gaza. When Washington and Tel Aviv escalated toward a decisive blow against Hezbollah, including targeted assassinations and intensive strikes aimed at destruction across the South, Dahieh, and Bekaa – culminating in the assassination of Sayyed Nasrallah – they were met with two surprises. First, the duo repositioned and swiftly transitioned from a support role to a defensive war for Lebanon under the banner of ceasefire and Resolution 1701. Second, the resistance and its supporters exhibited legendary resilience, forcing both Washington and Tel Aviv to progress toward a ceasefire under the same resolution.
Meanwhile Tel-Aviv under Washington’s cover is attempting to impose an image of victory over the resistance by exploiting the sixty-day period granted for its complete withdrawal.
Today, however, it faces a dilemma. It must choose between reneging on the agreement and risking another ground confrontation with a now-restrengthened resistance or proceeding with the ceasefire, even at the cost of conceding defeat. Any resumption of hostilities would erase the carefully curated image of dominance during the 60 days.
• Domestically, Washington attempted to leverage Lebanon’s presidential vacuum to weaken the resistance politically. However, Berri preemptively linked Resolution 1701 and a ceasefire calls for a consensus president to achieve unity in the face of Israeli aggression which was supported by Hezbollah. The U.S.’s plan aimed to project the resistance as the losing side in the war reflected in its political losses. However, Berri’s deft handling of the presidential file thwarted the U.S. manoeuvre and restored the resistance bloc’s pivotal position, denying its opponents the chance to claim that changes in presidential alignments signaled a shift in the balance of power between the resistance and the occupying entity. If external negotiations with foreign countries are a mandate for successful elections then Berri is the negotiator, and if the President must be one constructed and built domestically in Lebanon then Nebih Berri is the sole architect.
