January 11, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• Anyone who carefully reads the President’s inaugural speech will find a roadmap for transitioning the state’s right to monopolise arms from a mere legal principle into a concrete policy and actionable plan. Contrary to what critics of the resistance claim – often echoing Israeli narratives – that disarming the resistance is a prerequisite for Israel to fulfill its obligations under the ceasefire agreement, and contrary to their justification for tolerating Israeli aggression against Lebanon on the grounds that the resistance’s arms legitimise such attacks, the inaugural speech offers a different perspective. It emphasises a state’s right to monopolise arms and follow this statement directly with “A state that invests in its army to secure borders, enforce stability in the south, demarcate borders in the east, north, and maritime areas, combats smuggling, fights terrorism, preserves the unity of Lebanese territories, implements international resolutions, respects the armistice agreement, and prevents Israeli aggression on Lebanese territory, an army with a defensive combat doctrine tasked with protecting the people and waging wars within the bounds of the constitution”. States derive their legitimacy to monopolise arms from assuming responsibility for countering aggression.
• In practical terms, the agreement between the resistance and the President on a defense strategy culminates in the state’s exclusive control over arms enabled through a phased approach to coexistence between the army and the resistance. The first phase involves ensuring the withdrawal of the occupation forces to the Blue Line, as stipulated by the ceasefire agreement. During this phase, the resistance is tasked with transferring responsibility for responding to Israeli aggression and ensuring the occupiers’ withdrawal to the army. This includes adhering to timelines agreed upon with the army for the withdrawal of resistance forces from south of the Litani River, synchronised with the army’s deployment and the occupation forces’ withdrawal.
• The second phase, outlined in Resolution 1701 under paragraph 10, focuses on resolving what it terms as disputes over contested areas, such as the Shebaa Farms. This resolution calls for proposals from the UN Secretary-General to address these disputes. The inaugural speech underscores adherence to the 1949 armistice agreement which definitively affirms Lebanese sovereignty of the Shebaa Farms and other occupied territories, including Ras al-Naqoura and the contentious points along the border. This stance directly counters claims that the Lebanese identity of the Shebaa Farms hinges on border negotiations with Syria.
The President, as a former army commander, had participated in discussions with U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, referenced by Prime Minister Najib Mikati at the start of the previous year during ceasefire negotiations where Mikati had highlighted “the need to revive and implement the armistice agreement, restoring the situation in the south to its pre-1967 status and returning the Shebaa Farms which were under Lebanese sovereignty before they were gradually occupied. What is required is returning to the previous line of withdrawal under the armistice agreement”.
• The third phase involves the outcomes of the national dialogue on a defense strategy, as referred to in the inaugural speech. The President emphasised a “comprehensive defense policy as part of a national security strategy encompassing diplomatic, economic, and military dimensions, enabling the Lebanese state – yes, the Lebanese state – to end Israeli occupation and repel aggression on all Lebanese territories”.
This phase includes equipping the army to effectively counter aggression. Perhaps starting with addressing the continuous Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace as it’s time that the Lebanese army seeks to protect it by possessing a modern effective air defense system. This would mark the beginning of a fourth phase – one characterised by the gradual armament of the army with advanced capabilities, enabling it to shoulder liberation and defense responsibilities as outlined in the inaugural speech.
This fourth phase envisions an increasing contribution by the army and a corresponding decrease in the resistance’s contributions, potentially merging both efforts through innovative frameworks akin to Switzerland’s model of an armed populace. This could begin south of the Litani River and extend to regions like southern Awali and the western Bekaa, eventually encompassing missile capabilities.
• Those who perceive the inaugural speech as a call to disarm the resistance, assuming this would somehow compel the occupation to withdraw and halt its aggression, are misguided. They await a confrontation between the army and the resistance that is unlikely to materialise. The state’s right to monopolise arms is contingent upon its ability to fulfill its liberation and defense duties. Otherwise, the people’s right to resist occupation and aggression holds a higher standing under international law than the state’s claim to monopolise arms – a point clearly articulated in the speech.
