January 24, 2025
By Nasser Kandil
A new perspective is taking shape in the West regarding the future of “Israel”, shaped by an analysis of the outcomes of the longest war in the entity’s history. During this war, the occupation army was afforded unparalleled resources, conditions, and international cover it could scarcely hope to replicate. Despite this, the entity emerged with limited gains: eliminating leaders who can be replaced and destroying military capabilities that can be rebuilt. However, the losses it incurred are far harder to recover from or replace.
In the eyes of many in the West and within the entity itself, Israel has lost its global reputation as a democratic state with a professional army. It can no longer rely on the shield of the Holocaust narrative. Today, it stands as the perpetrator of a modern-day holocaust, not its victim. Its army is pursued as a murderous and criminal force, while its leaders face accusations of war crimes and genocide. More critically, Israel has lost the fighting spirit of its military, as evidenced by its failure to silence Gaza’s resistance or penetrate Lebanon in the face of the steadfastness of the resistance there. It also squandered the opportunity to eliminate the resistance movements it deemed existential threats that cannot be contained through agreements. Instead, it has been forced to accept the inevitability of coexisting with these movements along its northern and southern borders.
Israel has also failed to prove it can be both Jewish and democratic simultaneously. Its plans for expelling Palestinians and reclaiming land through occupation have collapsed, signaling the end of the “Greater Israel” project. This has sparked discussions about the concept of a “Lesser Israel” through a two-state solution, which would involve relinquishing the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem in exchange for a significant prize – normalisation with Saudi Arabia.
However, within the occupying entity, there is little readiness to accept this vision of a “Lesser Israel”. The only Palestinian state its leaders might entertain is one confined to Gaza, in exchange for formal approval of the annexation of the West Bank. The “Lesser Israel” that the entity’s leaders operate under today is confined to the geography stretching between Haifa and Ashkelon. This reality is underscored by the refusal of settlers near Gaza and in the northern regions to return, a direct consequence of the entity’s inability to neutralise the resistance.
This “Useful Israel” consists of a coastal strip approximately 100 kilometers long, between Haifa and Ashkelon, and extends 50 – 60 kilometers inland, encompassing around 7,000 square kilometers. However, consolidating this reality requires full control over the West Bank, which constitutes more than three-quarters of that area. For this reason, the occupation army is focusing its efforts, and will likely continue to do so for months, to assert its dominance over the West Bank and transform it into a domain under the control of settlers.
