January 24, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• A political narrative is being promoted with a sequence that claims logical coherence. It suggests that three major changes have recently occurred. The first is that the last war revealed the occupying entity’s overwhelming destructive capabilities, making the cost of war unbearable. The second is the impact of developments in Syria on Lebanese balances, particularly on the side that supports resistance. The third is the election of Donald Trump, bringing his unpredictable policies to the White House. This narrative argues that avoiding confrontation with Israel, while preserving Lebanese sovereignty, can be achieved by aligning with the emerging Arab-international climate. This climate, symbolised by recent presidential and prime ministerial appointments in Lebanon, purportedly opens the door to change, driven by efforts for peace and normalisation tied to the establishment of a Palestinian state, as proposed by Saudi Arabia and tacitly supported by the United States.
• This storyline appears to be little more than a patchwork of news stitched together into an analysis that lacks solid foundations. Does it offer a viable strategy for addressing the Israeli threat? Does it propose any means of neutralising it? The new reality in Syria offers a stark response: there is no resistance, nor even a political stance to trouble Benjamin Netanyahu. The new Syrian government refrained from opposing the annexation of the Golan Heights, which Netanyahu declared eternal. It displaced a regime and army that Netanyahu deemed a threat to Israeli security and pushed out Iran and Hezbollah, whom Netanyahu considers existential threats to Israel. Yet, did these positions spare Syria from Israeli incursions? Or are such incursions, in the eyes of this narrative’s proponents, deemed legitimate and justified? Should Lebanon, then, follow Syria’s example and accept the same outcome – agreeing to a geographic buffer zone Israel dictates and remaining silent under the pretense of self-preservation?
• If the answer is to reject Israeli incursions and uphold the armistice and ceasefire agreements as inviolable, what are Lebanon’s means to enforce this rejection? Is Arab and international support for the Lebanese state sufficient to ensure respect for its sovereignty? Experience over the past year and several months offers lessons. Israel has shown little regard for Arab and Western approval or disapproval, while the United States, the sole power with leverage over Israeli decisions, has demonstrated that its administrations prioritise Israeli interests and agendas over anything else. As for the notion of hinging hopes on a U.S.-Saudi initiative to establish a Palestinian state, this remains an illusion. The occupying entity’s Knesset has already legislated that such a state poses a threat to Israel’s future, effectively granting Israel an indefinite grace period to legitimise aggression and trample sovereignty under the guise of “waiting for the impossible”.
• The only realistic proposal with any merit is that Lebanon can safeguard its sovereignty solely through strength – a strength rooted in the state, even if it requires time to build. Resistance must complement this strength, with its proven combat capabilities and resources keeping the occupying entity in check. This necessitates recognising that the events of the past year are monumental, demanding thorough analysis, reflection, and the extraction of lessons. The state and the resistance must forge a new relationship based on a framework where the state assumes primary responsibility for protecting national sovereignty, with the resistance standing behind it.
This new framework could take shape starting from the successful implementation of the ceasefire agreement, which needs to be completed. However, such completion is impossible without an atmosphere of mutual trust, where President Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam can decisively affirm to those who exploit Baabda and the Grand Serail as platforms for targeting the resistance – that the presidency and government are committed to implementing Resolution 1701, lnot Resolution 1559.
