January 25, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• In recent days, publications attributed alternately to the occupying government, its army, or reported by Hebrew media outlets such as Maariv or Israel’s public broadcasting authority have centered on one pivotal issue: the claim that the occupying army will not fully and definitively withdraw beyond the Blue Line, as stipulated in the ceasefire agreement with varied reasons. The first is on certain strategic sites that cannot be abandoned due to their security importance, implying not only a disregard for the timeline but also a reevaluation of the principle of comprehensive withdrawal itself, with a decision to expand the occupied territories, including areas Lebanon claims outside the Blue Line. This is contrasted with a second narrative on an extension of one or two months as a necessary step for unspecified security and logistical arrangements yet to be completed, requiring additional time. Both narratives essentially grant the occupiers the unilateral right to determine which areas to vacate and when, thereby imposing conditions outside the agreement’s framework.
• An invitation was announced for a meeting of the entity’s security cabinet two days ago to discuss the 60-day withdrawal period under the ceasefire agreement. A few hours later, it was reported that the meeting will coincide with the second prisoner exchange deadline. However, following the meeting, no official statement was issued about the withdrawal or its postponement. Subsequently, Hebrew media reported that no formal proposal had been presented to the cabinet for discussion.
Finally, a statement from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office issued yesterday, requiring careful reading: it declared non-compliance with the withdrawal deadline, asserting that “The Israeli army’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon will take more than 60 days because Lebanon has not fully implemented the ceasefire agreement”. It further emphasised that “The phased withdrawal will continue in full coordination with the U.S. administration”, adding that “the withdrawal is contingent on the Lebanese army’s deployment and Hezbollah’s retreat beyond the Litani River”.
• The text implicitly recognises the ceasefire agreement and the 60-day deadline as binding on the occupiers, avoiding overt indications of withdrawal from or amendments to the agreement. This includes avoiding claims that could prioritise security or logistical considerations over the agreement’s stipulations. The justification for extending the timeline is the classic tactic of blaming the other party for non-compliance, thus legitimising reciprocal non-compliance. The statement asserts that “The withdrawal from south Lebanon is conditional on the deployment of Lebanon’s army and Hezbollah’s retreat beyond the Litani”.
• The statement does not overtly challenge the agreement’s framework, implying that the occupying leadership lacks the leeway to jeopardise it. This suggests that the occupying entity’s adherence is driven by a calculated restraint, not by international or Arab pressure. This calculation is evident from the occupier’s consistent disregard for such pressures in other contexts, such as Syria. There, the new government in Damascus replaced a regime that Netanyahu described as “playing with fire”. This shift removed Iran and Hezbollah as significant threats to the occupying entity and severed Hezbollah’s supply routes. Despite these exceptional services provided by the new government in Damascus, the occupying leadership displayed indifference, not even bothering to justify its actions in the region. Thus, Netanyahu’s position, framed as adherence to the agreement while blaming Lebanon for any breaches, appears to reflect a deeper fear: that openly abandoning or collapsing the agreement could lead to renewed confrontation with Hezbollah. The key takeaway here is that the option of returning to war remains unlikely for the occupying entity.
• This indicates that the occupying entity, intent on projecting strength and asserting dominance since the ceasefire declaration, has consistently pursued this image through its actions in the forward villages of the southern front over the 60-day period. It now seeks to use the deadline’s approach in the same direction – to reinforce its image of power and control. By initiating negotiations with the Lebanese army over measures and arrangements for Hezbollah’s withdrawal from south of the Litani River, the entity aims to extract intelligence gains and propose demands that enhance its security, further bolstering its dominant image and potentially securing specific additional benefits.
However, this approach is underpinned by a clear understanding that returning to war is not in its interest. Perhaps most notably, Netanyahu’s statement definitively addressed the conditions for Hezbollah under the agreement in exchange for the entity’s withdrawal. Netanyahu’s position is clear: “Hezbollah’s withdrawal beyond the Litani River”, not the disarmament of Hezbollah, as claimed by those in Lebanon who are “more Israeli than Israel itself”, a group that reflects that “you don’t have to be Jewish to be a Zionist” as their buddy Joe Biden stated.
