January 29, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• Despite the absence of an official U.S. announcement regarding a military withdrawal from Syria, the reports published by the Israeli Broadcasting Authority cannot be ignored. These reports indicate that Tel Aviv has been informed of the U.S. intention to withdraw from Syria and has expressed concerns over the implications for Israeli interests. While this decision may not be implemented for several months, it reflects a broader trend of reconfiguring the U.S. military presence in the region. This reconfiguration will inevitably lead to a political recalibration of America’s role and position, as well as the future of discussions surrounding the militarisation of the region – a goal that Israel desires and hopes Washington will actively support as a primary partner.
• The signals accompanying this announcement are likely linked to Israeli actions. One such signal is the announcement of a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 4, just a week away. It is expected that the withdrawal decision will be the main topic of discussion, alongside the guarantees Washington will provide to Tel Aviv to mitigate any adverse effects on the Israeli entity. These signals began to emerge even before the Israeli announcement, starting with U.S. support for an Israeli extension of the withdrawal deadline from southern Lebanon. The extension, as revealed by the raid on Nabatieh, serves as a cover for Israeli preemptive operations targeting the capabilities of resistance groups – a matter that must be taken seriously. The second signal came with Israel’s recent announcement of an indefinite stay in Mount Hermon, a move likely coordinated with the U.S. and expected to be part of the obligations imposed on the new Syrian government to regain control over areas with U.S. influence, including oil-rich regions.
• The Syrian implications of this decision are significant. First, there is a Turkish-U.S. understanding on the structure of the new Syrian administration, which must prioritise Israeli interests. This includes the establishment of a buffer zone with freedom of movement at a specified depth, encompassing Mount Hermon which Israel desires and Turkey commits not to jeopardise. Additionally, the formation of a transitional government is expected to pave the way for the gradual lifting of sanctions on Syria. This implies that the government must meet certain U.S. conditions, likely including appeasing Arab stakeholders and assuring them of shared influence with Turkey in the new Syria. At the core of this arrangement is a guaranteed role for U.S.-backed Kurdish groups, both in the formation of a new army and in the structure of new governing institutions, while also accommodating other European interests.
• The U.S. decision, framed as the conclusion of the battle against ISIS and the end of the American military mission, raises questions about the justification for maintaining U.S. troops in Iraq. The U.S. military leadership had previously argued for delaying the withdrawal from Iraq, citing the need to provide support and protection for U.S. forces in Syria. However, with this need now obsolete and the fight against ISIS effectively over, the withdrawal from Syria is likely part of a larger deal that includes exiting Iraq. This would necessitate regional understandings, particularly concerning U.S.-Iran relations, as Iran emerges as a key player in shaping Iraq’s geopolitical landscape. Such a scenario increases the likelihood of U.S.-Iranian agreements on the nuclear issue, fostering a climate of political relaxation essential for forging a consensus on Iraq’s future.
• An understanding with Iran, both on its nuclear program and Iraq, would remove obstacles to Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, potentially leading to a resolution in Yemen. This suggests that the region is moving toward political arrangements governed by settlements rather than wars. The aftermath of al-Aqsa Flood has reshaped the geopolitical and military map of the region. The timing of the Russian-Iranian treaty alongside the Russian delegation’s visit to Damascus, and its actions during its this advance toward Damascus, indicate a recognition that the battle is over and post-conflict arrangements in Syria are necessary. These arrangements appear to extend beyond Turkish-Russian understandings, with Washington not far removed from the process. This is evident in U.S.-Russian discussions about potential agreements on Ukraine, where it seems that what the U.S. has lost due to Israel’s diminished capabilities could be offset by new Syrian arrangements. In this context, the U.S. commitment to Israel’s security – through arms guarantees, funding, and support for Israeli security measures – will likely have Syria as its primary arena.
• Trump will not be able to deliver tangible benefits to Israel regarding the displacement of Gaza’s population, despite his rhetoric about resettling some in Jordan and Egypt. Similarly, he has little to offer in the context of the West Bank struggle. Israel faces three critical challenges: First, the contradiction between the need for security cooperation with the Palestinian Authority to counter resistance movements in the West Bank, and the political and security weakening of the Palestinian Authority as it aligns more closely with Israeli policies, leading to widespread suffering and the absence of any political or negotiating horizon for the Palestinian people. Second, the tension between Washington’s ability to facilitate Saudi-Israeli normalisation as a means of legitimising Israel’s regional role, and the requirement that Israel accept a Palestinian state – a solution it outright rejects. Third, and most critically, is the future of Jordan, which will be influenced by the U.S. withdrawal from Syria and Iraq, with internal stability and security interests at stake. The Palestinian issue remains a decisive factor in Jordan’s stability, especially as the West Bank faces escalating tensions, and the spectre of displacement to Jordan looms large in Jordanian minds, alongside the persistent Israeli idea of an alternative homeland.
