January 31, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• Israeli military conduct under the ceasefire agreements in both Lebanon and Gaza blends strategic considerations with tactical imperatives. Yet, at the strategic level, Israel’s leadership remains burdened by a reality they persist in denying: the exceptional conditions that enabled them in this war to attempt the eradication of the resistance: ample time, unconditional American support, an enraged climate among settlers and the army following al-Aqsa Flood operation, and unrestrained killing and destruction without accountability – are irreproducible. What was not achieved in this war will not be achieved in any future war, assuming there even is a future war. This stands in stark contrast to the strategic climate that followed the 2006 July War and the successive wars on Gaza, all of which were treated as opportunities to prepare for the next war. That war has now arrived, and what was not accomplished in it will remain beyond reach.
• A closer look at the agreements signed by Israel’s leaders reveals a stark truth: the illusion of being able to eliminate the resistance has collapsed irreversibly, and with each passing day, that collapse deepens, as evidenced by the images emerging from Gaza and southern Lebanon. There, vast, well-organised Palestinian military formations, both in manpower and armament, have taken shape, while the flags and symbols of the resistance now line the border with occupied Palestine. The bet on maintaining the occupation has also crumbled, as evidenced by Israel’s agreement to a complete withdrawal from both Gaza and southern Lebanon. Likewise, the strategy of forced displacement, whether in the effort to create a buffer zone in Lebanese border villages, where residents defied Israeli fire and forced the occupation to retreat from most of them, or in Gaza, where displacement is directly tied to the Jewish identity of the Israeli state, has failed. The demographic imbalance increasingly favours Palestinians, while immigration to Israel declines. An entity that failed to occupy and displace Gaza’s population across a mere 360 square kilometers has no legitimacy to speak of a “Greater Israel”. An entity that failed to impose its will on the resistance in Lebanon and Gaza has no standing to claim itself a “Great Israel”. And an entity whose leaders now face global pursuit for genocide, war crimes, and the killing of children has forfeited any credibility in speaking of a “Mighty Israel”.
• Parallel to this strategic reality, another fundamental truth emerges: just as this war has rendered the prospect of another war impossible, it has also shifted Western discourse toward securing Israel’s existence through Arab recognition – namely, normalisation with Saudi Arabia – accompanied by a political resolution to the Palestinian issue centered on establishing a Palestinian state. However, Israel, both in its religious and secular factions, continues its radicalisation, producing an overwhelming majority that stifles any chance of leadership willing to align with the evolving global and Western climate. This means that the international push for a resolution will remain without an Israeli partner. Any Israeli figure who dares to challenge the extremist dominance will meet the fate of Yitzhak Rabin, assassinated by the very factions that have since given rise to the likes of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.
• Amid these two realities – the incapacity to wage another war and the inability to embrace any political resolution, Israel finds itself hesitant in implementing the ceasefire agreements in Lebanon and Gaza, constantly seeking avenues to evade its commitments. The only deterrent against reneging is the certainty that returning to war is no longer an option. At the same time, Israel remains unable to reconcile with the unfolding realities of its defeat, particularly as the images from Gaza continue to project undeniable truths. It is fully aware that the resistance in Lebanon and Gaza possesses not only formidable strength but also the ability to plan, maneuver, endure, and rebuild. Israel cannot afford to merely stand by, nor can it retire from the battlefield, nor can it surrender.
• The doctrine of the ‘battle between wars’ was conceived for precisely such scenarios. Israel has implemented this strategy effectively in Syria for years – avoiding full-scale war while refusing to remain passive. This approach is likely to define its engagement with the Lebanese and Gazan fronts both during and after the implementation of ceasefire agreements. The challenge before the resistance, therefore, is to craft a strategy capable of dismantling this doctrine and reshaping the strategic conclusions that dictate the unfolding reality.
