In Lebanon and Syria, the Questions Loom …Washington Holds the Key

February 26, 2025

Nasser Kandil

• In a coincidence that is both striking and telling, Lebanon’s Parliament convened to discuss the ministerial statement of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government, the first administration under President Joseph Aoun, at the same time that Syria’s National Dialogue Conference was held in preparation for the announcement of a transitional government in the coming days. This new Syrian government is meant to derive some measure of legitimacy from the conference, while its presidency requires an even greater degree of legitimacy – a position now assumed by Ahmad al-Sharaa, formerly Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly Jabhat al-Nusra.
Despite the differences in circumstances between Lebanon and Syria, both countries have experienced what can be described as a soft coup in the aftermath of the al-Aqsa Flood war, within the framework of an American project to redraw the region’s geopolitical landscape. In Lebanon, the U.S. openly backed Army Commander Joseph Aoun as the sole presidential candidate, securing near-unanimous parliamentary and popular support under the banner of shielding Lebanon from renewed and expanded wars, enabling economic recovery, and ensuring reconstruction efforts.

The Lebanese placed their hopes in these promises, believing that American backing would secure these goals, in return for the Resistance stepping back militarily to a secondary role while advancing politically to the forefront. Meanwhile, in Syria, a different path unfolded, leading to the fall of the previous regime without armed confrontation. This outcome was shaped by years of U.S. sanctions, sustained Israeli airstrikes, and the broader consequences of the Al-Aqsa Flood war on the Axis of Resistance, particularly the martyrdom of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, which had a profound impact on the morale and internal stability of the former Syrian government. Consequently, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham ascended to power, a development that aligns with Washington’s vision for the region’s new political and geographical order.

• The discussions and recorded statements in both Beirut and Damascus are filled with rhetoric about state-building, reform, national unity, and civil peace. However, those involved understand that the real contest lies between two competing visions. The first hopes that Washington will restrain Tel Aviv from escalating its aggression against Lebanon and Syria, granting the new leadership a chance to maintain its credibility. This would allow them to claim victory in their gamble on Washington, proving its worth to a skeptical public, and pave the way for the U.S. to release reconstruction funds for Lebanon and lift sanctions on Syria without forcing humiliating concessions to Tel Aviv.

The second vision, however, sees Washington’s regional strategy as inherently committed to preserving the occupying entity’s dominance. Under this framework, any party seeking to align with the U.S. must prove its loyalty to the entity by fulfilling its security, political, and economic demands, making American assistance in regional recovery conditional upon satisfying Israeli terms. Advocates of this view point to how Washington pressures even stable, key regional players like Egypt and Jordan, using humanitarian aid as leverage to push them toward compliance with Israeli interests, particularly in relation to Gaza’s forced displacement, despite the existential risks this poses to their own regimes.
• While Lebanon’s and Syria’s new governments have laid out long-term plans, the coming months will be decisive. Israeli airstrikes are already setting the pace, pressing both Beirut and Damascus to an inflection point. Soon, the Lebanese and Syrian people will see which bet prevails: the wager on American friendship, trusting that it will shield them from Israeli aggression, prevent sovereignty-eroding demands, and preserve national dignity, or the belief that Washington is nothing more than a guardian of the occupying entity, making reliance on it a futile illusion. And that building power, embodied in the resistance, remains the sole path to safeguarding national sovereignty and preserving the dignity of both the people and the state in Lebanon and Syria.

The choices made by the ruling authorities hold little weight in altering the broader trajectory of either nation. If the bet on the United States fails, the resistance will inevitably rise and sweep across both arenas, making the fate of the governments, not the countries themselves, hinge on their decisions. Should those in power ultimately align with their people at the end of the limited window granted to their wager on Washington’s support, the burden on both nations and their citizens will be significantly eased, perhaps even laying the groundwork for deeper Lebanese-Syrian coordination and new alliances within the resistance. Conversely, if the gamble on U.S. friendship succeeds, as the ruling authorities hope, those committed to the path of resistance will not obstruct the process. But the question remains: would these governments extend the same courtesy, if the outcome were reversed, and refrain from obstructing the path of the resistance?