February 27, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• The three months spanning from March 1 to June 1, 2025, mark a pivotal transitional phase in the region’s history. A new transitional government is set to emerge in Syria, ostensibly forming the foundation of transitional legitimacy alongside the existing presidency, based on the premise that the dialogue conference held in Damascus serves as a constituent parliament for the new governance, despite its representational shortcomings. In Lebanon, the newly formed government will begin exercising its constitutional responsibilities after securing parliamentary confidence. In Palestine, the first phase of the ceasefire agreement will have concluded, bringing us to a decisive moment regarding the fate of the second phase and the future of the agreement. Meanwhile, the Arab Summit is expected to convene, setting the parameters of the Arab stance in response to the displacement project targeting Gaza and defining the Arab perspective on the broader challenges facing the Palestinian cause in the aftermath of Al-Aqsa Flood.
• Across these four dimensions, the three-month period leading up to June 1 is critical, as the central issue that will determine the fate of these key battlefields will be put to the test – a test requiring no more than three months to reveal the trajectory the region will take. Despite the many Syrian-centric discussions surrounding the new government, whether in its favour or against it, the decisive factor remains the dual pressures of U.S. sanctions on one side and Israeli aggression on the other. These three months will clarify whether the new government in Damascus will secure the lifting of sanctions and gain financial and economic maneuverability independent of U.S. conditions to accommodate Israeli demands, or whether Washington will insist that sanctions remain in place unless Israeli conditions are met. In that scenario, how will the newly established government in Damascus respond? And how will its regional backers in Ankara and Doha react, whether regarding U.S. sanctions or ongoing Israeli incursions and attacks? Capitulation would lead to the complete national collapse of the new government, exposing Doha and Ankara to a resounding scandal, whereas opting for confrontation, even through indirect sponsorship of the resistance, would mark a major shift in the balance of conflict. Meanwhile, silence, whether out of negligence or complicity, would leave room for alternative power dynamics to be shaped by those at the forefront of the struggle, rallying Syria behind them. By June 1, a new reality will undoubtedly emerge.
• In Lebanon, despite the many pressing issues likely to be outlined in the ministerial statement, the foremost concern will be the future of Israeli occupation and aggression, along with its implications for the relationship between the state and the resistance. Will the government and the new presidential administration succeed in securing an American commitment to uphold its guarantees regarding the ceasefire agreement and prevent Israeli violations? Will they also manage to unlock funding for the reconstruction of what the war has destroyed without Washington exploiting this need to impose conditions aimed at dismantling the resistance’s arsenal – conditions that exceed the terms of the agreement itself? Or will Lebanon find itself facing a diplomatic dead end, forcing difficult choices: either the army takes the decision to confront the occupation, the state turns a blind eye to a popular or partisan resistance emerging in response to Israeli aggression, or Lebanon accepts U.S.-Israeli conditions and enters into a political, or even non-political, confrontation with the resistance? Each of these choices carries significant consequences that will shape the future of Lebanon, its government, and its presidency. The three months between March 1 and June 1 will be enough to bring clarity to this picture.
• In Palestine, the stage will be set for serious deliberations on Gaza’s future. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have to decide whether to proceed with a second phase, officially declaring an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza in exchange for the return of the remaining living captives, who include high-ranking officers and soldiers, or to resort to obstruction and delay, ultimately opting to abandon the second phase altogether. These three months will be sufficient to determine the course of action. If Netanyahu chooses to implement the agreement and accepts the establishment of a social support committee, overseen by Egypt and composed of non-partisan figures to manage Gaza, knowing full well that Hamas retains control over the territory, its weapons, and its people, then a new phase will begin, solidifying the resistance’s victory and triggering deep political repercussions within Israel. No matter how loudly Israeli officials proclaim victory, such rhetoric will lack credibility. However, if Netanyahu seeks to evade the agreement through indirect means, the risk of renewed war will remain high, ushering Gaza, and the entire region, into an entirely different phase.
• On the Arab front, it is evident that Arab states will seek dialogue with Washington, proposing technical plans that claim to enable Gaza’s reconstruction without displacement. Yet they fully understand that the real issue lies elsewhere: the fundamental question is whether they can successfully push Washington toward linking Gaza’s ‘day after’ scenario to the establishment of a Palestinian state, making Arab normalisation contingent on this condition. Will they persist in this demand, only to hear Washington respond with unwavering solidarity with Israel, prompting them to retreat into silence to avoid confrontation? If they manage to bring Washington into the framework of a Palestinian state, the region will enter one phase. If Washington refuses and Arab states escalate pressure to impose their vision – defending their interests and the stability of their regimes- a different phase will unfold. But if they once again resort to silence, as they did during the war on Gaza, an entirely different phase will take shape.
• Between March 1 and June 1, a new chapter will inevitably begin.
