March 03, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• The leaders of the occupying entity make no secret of the fact that their plans for Lebanon are part of a broader vision encompassing their occupation strategies in Gaza and Syria. The doctrine of buffer zones serves as the common thread connecting these fronts, shifting in scale from the Philadelphia Axis in Gaza to the Five Hills and the Lebanese section of Ghajar, extending to the Syrian provinces of Daraa, Sweida, and Quneitra. Likewise, they openly acknowledge that these plans enjoy full American support, despite Washington’s role in crafting and guaranteeing ceasefire agreements in Lebanon and Gaza. Israel’s plans constitute a direct repudiation of these agreements, while U.S. backing amounts to an abdication of its responsibilities as a guarantor.
Meanwhile, in Syria, neither the new ruling authority nor its regional sponsors, particularly Turkey and Qatar, can expect special treatment despite having offered valuable concessions to Washington and Tel Aviv. From the perspective of the U.S. and Israel, the expulsion of Iran and Hezbollah from Syria and the severance of resistance supply lines are the returns on their long-term investments: Israel’s prolonged war against Syria and America’s devastating sanctions, which have crippled the economy and starved the Syrian people. Now, those who have inherited power through these American and Israeli contributions to regime change must settle the bill. Meeting Israel’s demands may well become the price for lifting U.S. sanctions on Syria.
• Viewing Lebanon through the lens of Palestine and Syria clarifies the situation, dispelling any illusions that Israel’s violations of the ceasefire might be mere posturing or coercive bargaining. It becomes evident that Lebanon is not facing a temporary or incidental challenge but a serious and sustained campaign backed by the United States, mirroring developments in Palestine and Syria. This is part of a strategic plan – one that does not hinge on Israel’s military capabilities to resume war and alter its terms in ways previous rounds failed to achieve. Instead, it is rooted in an Israeli belief that the political environments surrounding the resistance, particularly those influencing decision-making in Lebanon, Palestine, and the broader Arab and regional landscape, do not fully grasp the depth of the occupying entity’s internal and strategic crisis. Rather, these actors calculate their moves based on a desire to avoid further wars, having witnessed the scale of destruction, and seek to appease Washington for fear of economic sanctions, having seen their impact on Syria. As a result, Israeli leadership believes that a combination of military pressure and American coercion could secure gains that war itself failed to deliver.
• Through the lens of Palestine, the Lebanese can dismiss the manufactured debate stirred by those hostile to the resistance regarding the presence of disarmament clauses in the ceasefire agreement. This narrative seeks to absolve Israel of its violations and exonerate Washington from reneging on its commitments. In Palestine, there is no ambiguity: the agreement clearly outlines a three-phase process, and there is no dispute that Israel’s refusal to proceed to the second phase constitutes a breach. Likewise, there is no doubt that U.S. support for Israel’s breach represents a betrayal of its own envoy’s role in drafting the agreement and Washington’s position as a guarantor. While Egypt and Qatar ensure Hamas and the resistance factions uphold their commitments, Washington’s sole responsibility is to ensure Israeli compliance, yet it has blatantly abandoned this duty.
• Through the lens of Syria, Lebanon sees two critical realities. The first is Israel’s renewed efforts to manipulate sectarian divisions, presenting itself as a protector of minorities and engaging in Lebanon’s internal reconciliation discourse to prevent its destabilisation tactics from backfiring domestically. Lebanon has a long memory of how Israel has historically exploited its sectarian fabric. The second reality is the collapse of the illusion that flexibility and concessions can yield solutions or mitigate threats. Lebanon cannot offer Israel services on the scale of those provided by Syria’s new leadership. Nor does it have sponsors with the same weight and influence as those backing Damascus, such as Turkey and Qatar, whose standing in Washington is considerable. The removal of Iran and Hezbollah from Syria and the disruption of resistance supply lines were seen as invaluable Israeli gains, yet they failed to shield Syria from Israeli aggression.
• Given these evolving realities, the Lebanese state, in all its institutions, must engage in a serious and pragmatic discussion on how to navigate this complex phase, free from illusions and unburdened by short-sighted calculations.
