March 04, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• Just as the wars on the Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran fronts have served as an extension and support for Gaza’s war, the Gaza front remains the primary battlefield through which the occupying entity’s available options can be put to the test, whether in returning to war,,, as some Arabs, including some Lebanese, assume or desire, or in pursuing zero-sum strategies like mass displacement. At the same time Gaza also serves as the ultimate gauge of the entity’s capacity to endure the repercussions of political settlements, whether temporary and tactical, such as ceasefire agreements in Lebanon or Gaza, or comprehensive resolutions like the two-state proposal.
• Gaza may be the smallest battlefield in geographic terms, yet it remains the most complex and challenging in its conditions. But does this mean that the option of resuming war remains on the table for the occupying entity and Benjamin Netanyahu’s government, as suggested by the decision to block aid entry and suspend the ceasefire agreement by refusing to advance negotiations into their second phase, which requires a formal end to the war and a full withdrawl from Gaza?
• Netanyahu’s government had already implemented the ceasefire agreement reluctantly, fueling speculation that Netanyahu himself wished to continue the war but was restrained by pressure and threats from the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. Trump, eager to enter the White House with a declared ceasefire in Gaza, pressured Netanyahu into halting hostilities. However, when Hamas, two weeks ago, suspended the prisoner exchange process in protest against Israeli violations in aid deliveries, Trump erupted with threats of “hell” unless Hamas released all captives at once. This, in effect, freed Netanyahu from any commitment to maintaining the ceasefire, unless Hamas capitulated. Yet Hamas did not capitulate. Instead, Netanyahu ultimately agreed to resume the exchange under the previous conditions, which Trump had mocked, saying, “We will no longer accept waiting for three prisoners to be released each week, we want them all, or it’s hell.” Netanyahu’s refusal to lean on Trump’s threats and reignite the war ultimately reveals why he agreed to the deal: war was no longer a viable option, nor one capable of achieving its objectives.
• Following the first phase of the agreement, the occupying forces withdrew from Gaza, repositioning themselves at its southern, northern, and eastern edges. Any attempt to reoccupy the Strip would now require launching new ground battles. Meanwhile, the resistance has prepared itself for direct combat, akin to the confrontations fought in Lebanon’s southern villages, a tactic it had deliberately avoided during the October 2023 ground invasion to prevent bearing responsibility for the destruction and massacres the occupiers would commit and blame on the resistance. But now, with everything already destroyed and the massacres already committed, delivering a lesson in ground warfare is both justified and long overdue. Should war break out again, Yemen would reenter the fray not from where it started but from where it left off, and rockets would once more rain down on Tel Aviv daily, this time with the confirmed failure of the Iron Dome to intercept them.
• The prisoner file, a major point of pressure on both the U.S. and the occupying entity, has only grown more pressing after the first phase’s completion. It will gain even greater urgency with every stalled ground operation and each captive killed by Israeli airstrikes. Yesterday’s Knesset session exposed Netanyahu’s growing weakness and anxiety, stripping him of the aura of authority he once commanded. Now a lame duck, he faces accusations from the captives’ families of being held hostage to Bezalel Smotrich’s hardline stance, Smotrich, who has threatened to collapse the government should the agreement proceed toward ending the war and withdrawing from Gaza. By all accounts, Netanyahu is at his weakest, incapable of advancing the agreement and incapable of waging war.
Perhaps now, he will need Trump’s intervention not to escalate but to climb down from the tree, to claim he is acting in deference to Trump’s wishes. This might explain the upcoming visit of Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, whose mission, according to official statements, will be either to extend the first phase of the deal or to initiate negotiations for the second.
