The Actual Balance of Power Between the Occupation and the Resistance

March 06, 2025

Nasser Kandil

• If distinguishing one’s discourse from that of the resistance necessitates invoking the wars of others on Lebanese soil or speaking of regional axes and the need to exit them, then such rhetoric belongs to the past and has lost its legitimacy. This was true since the ceasefire and even more so after Syria’s strategic transformation. Iran is no longer the accusation used to pursue the resistance as part of a regional project exploiting Lebanon for its service. Iran is now absent from Syria, with no direct geographical link to Hezbollah. Likewise, Hezbollah is no longer stationed along the borders, eliminating direct geographical friction with the occupation.

The discourse has shifted from questions posed by those who doubt the resistance, to questions raised by the resistance itself. The path is now clear for those who advocate diplomacy, relying on the state’s legitimacy, its flag, and its army to reclaim land and halt aggression. Yet, after months, this option has shown no viability, and with each passing day, it loses more credibility.

Lebanon’s presidency is currently occupied by a former army commander who enjoys national consensus, including from the resistance. He is a friend of the West, believes in ties with the U.S., and the resistance has entrusted him and the army with exclusive responsibility for South Lebanon under Resolution 1701. He affirms this in discussions and interviews, placing the blame on the occupation for obstructing full implementation of the resolution. The premiership is held by a respected figure of integrity, also aligned with the West and committed to diplomacy as the means of securing Lebanese sovereignty against the occupation with international, particularly American, backing. Yet, as time passes and this bet fails, more voices will ask: Is there an alternative to confrontation? Either through army-resistance cooperation or by making room for the resistance.

A crucial yet often overlooked factor in assessing the balance of power between the resistance and the occupation is legitimacy, both moral and political. If the occupation withdraws and halts its aggression – a prospect growing increasingly unlikely, the resistance emerges victorious, as such a retreat would occur due to the resistance’s existence and a retreat would aim to deny the resistance any legitimacy of continued action. But if the occupation remains and diplomacy fails, the resistance gains even greater legitimacy as the sole viable option, whether in coordination with the army or independently.

In military terms, the equation is no longer about direct war and firepower competition. Should confrontation resume, the occupation knows that the decisive factor will be ground warfare, whether through prolonged attrition or an eventual full-scale battle. This brings us back to the pre-ceasefire reality: during the sixty days of frontline village battles ulnlike the 60 days that followed. Prior to the cease fire it became evident that the occupation army’s ground forces were incapable of matching those of the resistance. The balance tipped entirely in the resistance’s favour, and no matter what the occupation does, it cannot restore what its army has lost, in equilibrium, fighting spirit, and manpower. Even the occupation’s chief of staff concedes that rebuilding its forces to their pre-war state would take at least a decade.

• Perhaps the third and most crucial dimension of the balance of power is the people, the environment surrounding the occupation army versus that of the resistance. The metric is simple: it is manifested in the eagerness of border populations to return. Time and again, we have witnessed southern Lebanese civilians storming back into their villages, offering martyrs and wounded to reclaim their homes, despite having no houses left, surrounded by ruins, and receiving no state assistance for reconstruction. The state, in fact, may even punish those who attempt rebuilding without its permission.

Meanwhile, Israeli reports reveal that despite generous government incentives, only 19,000 settlers have returned to northern settlements. The occupation government manipulates these numbers, claiming they constitute 30% of the 67,000 evacuees, yet its own National Emergency Authority reported that in October 2023, just days after the Gaza front was opened, 125,000 settlers had fled, half without official evacuation programs. By March 2024, The Wall Street Journal cited 225,000 displaced settlers, while Israeli media throughout the war referenced a figure of 300,000. This means the actual return rate is no more than 10%, possibly as low as 6%. The occupation government openly admits that one of its reasons for projecting strength in South Lebanon, after losing the ground battle and as a U.S.-brokered ceasefire takes hold, is to convince settlers to return.

Ultimately, the balance of power between the resistance and the occupation is measured in one equation: the return of displaced people, whether to the town of Khyam or to Kiryat Shmona.

• Those who oppose the path of resistance may not realise that they, too, are part of the occupying entity’s strategy, part of shaping its legitimacy and defining the balance of power in the battles to come.