Does Al-Shara’s Agreement With the SDF Serve to Cover Up the Coastal Massacres?

March 11, 2025

Nasser Kandil

The sudden announcement of an agreement between the head of the ruling regime in Damascus, Ahmad al-Shara, and the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Mazloum Abdi, comes just ahead of a UN Security Council session convened at the joint request of Russia and the United States. The session aims to address the situation in Syria in light of the massacres committed by factions of the ruling regime in the Syrian coastal region, which, according to documented UN reports, have claimed thousands of lives. The UN mission that recently visited the coast also reported a unanimous demand from its residents for international protection.

This timing raises the question of whether the agreement is an attempt to deflect international outrage over accusations against al-Shara and his allied armed factions. These accusations suggest that their monopoly on power is driven by an extreme religious vision that renders them incapable of coexistence with other groups, with the massacres seen as a manifestation of this ideological rigidity. The agreement, then, could serve as a large-scale implicit response to these charges, presenting the Damascus regime as open to engagement, particularly with the Kurdish component, which remains one of the most complex elements of the Syrian landscape and enjoys strong European and American backing.

Damascus’ official narrative, attempting to justify the massacres as responses to local violations, has failed to convince either domestic or international audiences. Prior to the massacres, calls for jihad and mobilisation were broadcast from every mosque in Syria, something that could only happen with authorisation from the highest authorities. This was followed by the nighttime movement of thousands of armed men in convoys toward the coast, a movement observed and identified by government security agencies, which, in reality, are armed factions operating under official cover. These fighters then stormed coastal towns and villages, engaging in killing, looting, and sexual violence.

This raises a critical question: how does the government categorise these fighters? Are they, like other civilians refusing to surrender their weapons, to be pursued under the same measures applied in the coastal region? Or are they privileged militias exempt from disarmament because they serve as auxiliary forces to the ruling factions? What happened only reinforces these accusations and necessitates an acknowledgment that the massacres were carried out by an illegitimate militia that was tolerated, unlike other militias in different sectarian communities, due to its sectarian affiliation. The regime must confront this reality and address it beyond the hollow narrative of individual prosecutions before non-existent courts.

The future of intercommunal relations across Syria, south, north, west, and center, remains under the scrutiny of major powers, especially amid a qualitative shift marked by a U.S.-Russian understanding on Ukraine, countered by a Turkish-European alignment. This may explain Europe’s hesitant criticism of the Damascus regime’s actions, its mild language of reproach, and its appreciation of what the EU has termed Damascus’ “swift response” in pursuing violations. Meanwhile, Washington has used much harsher language, condemning what it described as “criminal acts” committed by “extremist terrorists”, signaling that the U.S. has no intention of lifting sanctions on Syria – an issue that deeply troubles the regime.

Al-Shara himself has stated that maintaining security is impossible without lifting U.S. sanctions, recognising that the removal of European sanctions would have limited impact given the complexities of the global banking system, which remains tied to American restrictions. This also suggests that Washington and Moscow may be moving toward a minimal form of internationalisation in Syria under the guise of UN human rights monitors, potentially even under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such an arrangement would not conflict with Israel’s interests, as it would allow the southern region to remain an operational zone for Israeli military activity, nor would it unsettle Russia, which could leverage it in negotiations with the Damascus regime over its votes at the UN Security Council.

The timing of Al-Shara’s agreement with the SDF casts attention on its substance. At its core, it is merely a political statement – one that the SDF had previously proposed but that Al-Shara rejected due to its vagueness, only to later accept without modification. The statement does not clarify how the Kurdish component will be integrated into Syrian state institutions. Will it maintain its military structure as an independent force within a decentralised defense ministry, as the SDF demands but Damascus rejects? Or will its fighters be absorbed individually into the national army and redistributed across its units – a step the defense ministry prefers to prevent the dilution of its ideologically homogeneous factions?

The same ambiguity extends to the management of oil resources and border crossings. Will the SDF govern these assets independently, forwarding only a portion of revenues to the state while retaining the rest, as per its proposed decentralisation model? Or will it dissolve its formations entirely and establish new entities subordinate to Damascus? The absence of clear answers in the agreement suggests that the underlying conflicts remain unresolved, which is why implementation has been left open-ended until the end of the year.

While the agreement resembles more of a temporary truce between Damascus and the SDF, it remains under close scrutiny both domestically and internationally. Given that its practical function appears to be little more than a statement of intent, it is likely to receive positive media coverage but will be treated with caution until concrete steps toward implementation are taken. Meanwhile, it does not obscure the events in the coastal region. If the strategic significance of Syria’s regions is measured by their oil and gas reserves, then the coast remains the most promising energy hub in the country.