March 14, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• With the issuance of the constitutional declaration for the transitional phase in Syria, the time may have come to understand why the new leadership in Damascus opposes adopting Resolution 2254 as the framework for transition. The stated justification has been that the resolution envisions a dialogue and settlement between the former regime and the opposition, and with the fall of the former regime, the resolution itself is rendered obsolete. However, this argument is easily countered by the fact that the opposition, of which the new leadership in Damascus was once a part, had always interpreted the resolution as linking the formation of the transitional governing body to the departure of the former president. So what, then, is the real reason for rejecting Resolution 2254?
• The constitutional declaration provides ample answers to this question. Resolution 2254 envisioned a transition aligned with international standards, which rest on three fundamental pillars. The first is a transitional period capped at 18 months, as transitional governance lacks legitimacy derived from the people’s will, which is the sole source of legitimate authority. The second pillar is a collective governing body, as stipulated in the resolution, rather than an individual leader. The logic behind such a structure, despite its internal contradictions, is precisely what justifies its adoption: in the absence of elections to confer legitimacy, how can an unelected individual be entrusted with an entire state, its resources, and its people? The collective body, with its built-in contradictions, acts as a safeguard against the dominance of any single political, ideological, religious, or ethnic faction. Its decision-making process, whether by consensus or through specific voting thresholds depending on the nature and significance of decisions, ensures that no group can impose its will on others. The third pillar is that the governing body, formed by a Security Council resolution, does not issue a constitutional declaration for the transitional period but rather drafts a general constitution for the country, which is then put to a referendum, with elections held under UN supervision.
• Reading the constitutional declaration reveals how all three pillars have been undermined. The transition period has been extended to five years instead of 18 months – an exceptionally long duration for a transitional phase, raising concerns of authoritarian entrenchment. Granting an unelected authority such an extended mandate not only risks consolidating its grip on power but also provides ample time to manipulate future elections through control over state resources and institutions. This concern is further amplified by the fact that power is concentrated in a single individual belonging to a specific political faction, ideological current, sect, religion, and ethnicity, raising fears among other parties, sects, faiths, and national groups. This signals an intent to pave the way for the transitional president’s continued rule beyond the transitional phase, potentially for multiple terms, thereby stripping the constitutional declaration of its transitional nature. Instead of serving as a stepping stone toward a democratic system based on popular will, it becomes a mechanism for controlling and co-opting that will, laying the groundwork for one-party rule and the dominance of its ideology, sect, religion, and ethnicity.
• A genuine transitional constitutional declaration seeks to establish the shortest possible duration with the least possible powers. When broader powers are granted, the term is shortened accordingly; conversely, when the term is extended, powers are restricted. Yet this declaration provides both the broadest powers and the longest duration. Additionally, transitional declarations typically refrain from settling foundational issues that should be addressed in a permanent constitution, such as the state’s relationship with religion, the nature of the political system, and national identity, ensuring that such matters are subject to public referendum rather than unilateral decisions by a president who appoints the constitutional drafting committee. In terms of powers, transitional declarations usually impose stringent limitations on the governing body, especially when it consists of a single individual. Such limitations operate in two ways: first, by restricting transitional authority to managing the state’s day-to-day affairs, except in cases of urgent necessity requiring broader powers; second, by ensuring that decisions affecting fundamental freedoms require approval from other governing bodies, such as a constitutional court or legislative authority.
• Because the constitutional declaration disregarded all these principles, it was only natural for the new leadership to push for eliminating any role for Resolution 2254. This allowed for replacing an 18-month transition with a five-year term, substituting collective governance with individual rule, and rushing to settle identity-related issues instead of postponing them for broader national deliberation. Such an approach lays the groundwork for prolonged instability, at a time when Syria is enduring one of its harshest periods of turmoil.
