March 15, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• The political and media landscape is awash with attempts to market certain narratives as if they reflect Lebanon’s current reality in its struggle against the occupation. The first asserts that resistance as a project to confront the occupation has failed, that America dominates the world, that Israel has demonstrated absolute superiority, and that the Arab era is one of normalisation, culminating in a call to embrace it. The second claims that Lebanon is weary of fighting others’ wars on its soil, that it has given more than it can afford for Palestine, and that it is time to step back and seek respite. But do these equations stand on solid logical ground, or are they mere delusions, fantasies, and wishful thinking divorced from reality?
• Let’s begin with the first equation. To assess it objectively, we set aside the notions of resistance as a choice, a project, or an organised fighting force. A useful starting point is the post-Cold War era, when Hezbollah had yet to lead the resistance, and Hamas had not assumed that role in Palestine. At the time, the prevailing premise was America’s unquestioned dominance and power – an indisputable reality. Similarly, Israel’s absolute superiority was widely assumed, particularly in the early 1990s, when Shimon Peres envisioned a “Greater Israel”.
Today, however, the idea of U.S. absolute dominance warrants scrutiny, while the notion of Israeli military supremacy is openly mocked by prominent Israeli intellectuals and dismissed by military strategists as little more than a bad joke. In parallel, the push for normalisation by Arab states is now constrained by the enduring centrality of the Palestinian cause, which has resurfaced as an issue that cannot be sidelined. Yet, back then, both the U.S. and Israel formally accepted the creation of a Palestinian state. These factors, America’s unchallenged dominance, Israel’s perceived military superiority, Arab aspirations for peace, and an American-Israeli compromise allowing Arab leaders to save face through the promise of Palestinian statehood, led to the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords.
In response, the Palestine Liberation Organisation laid down its arms and recognised Israel and Hamas remained a marginal force. Yet the Madrid process collapsed, Oslo failed, and instead of the West Bank becoming a Palestinian state in 1998, as envisioned in the accords, by 2025, it has become a network of settlements housing a million armed settlers who elect figures like Ben Gvir and Smotrich.
• How can we account for the failure of the peace process in the absence of any meaningful Arab resistance? Anyone who reflects on this would recognise that a golden rare opportunity was squandered – one that could have tested the viability of peace at a time when Israeli religious extremism was still a minority, yet powerful enough to assassinate Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and derail the process before it could take root.
Today, that extremism has grown exponentially, ensuring the continuation of its project, after America, which once was able to wage wars, has become limited to offering financial aid, weapons, and political cover, and after the Israeli army has become incapable of boasting invincibility; and where its remaining power lies in wielding a political veto against any proposed solutions, backed by unwavering U.S. support and an Arab world that continues to insist that America holds all the cards. Only the delusional, the deranged, and the hopelessly naive still believe in peace, normalisation, or a Palestinian state, even on paper.
• Faced with this political and diplomatic deadlock, one must recall the period after the Taif Agreement. There was an assumption that Israel would withdraw in accordance with Resolution 425. That dream was shattered, leaving those who rejected resistance but hoped that it might succeed, while cursing it all the same, accusing it of waging foreign wars. Yet when liberation was achieved in 2000, they were the first to rush forward, not just to offer congratulations but to bask in the victory.
• As for the proponents of the “wars of others” theory: that Lebanon has given too much for Palestine, they may find ample arguments to support their view. But they must answer two crucial questions. First, when the regional pretext for Israeli war disappears, when there is no longer a non-Lebanese force to fight, why doesn’t Israel withdraw? Instead, it makes new demands that threaten Lebanese sovereignty. Is that not precisely what happened in 1982, when the PLO left but the occupation remained for 18 years until resistance drove it out? And today, hasn’t the supposed Iran-Israel war theory collapsed, with Iran withdrawing from Syria, Hezbollah retreating south of the Litani, and direct military friction ending? Yet Israel still refuses to withdraw. Why? Could it be because its demands from Lebanon go beyond security concerns and include territorial ambitions, such as seizing strategic heights that support Israeli security and enhance its position while leaving Lebanon without cover and decreasing its status. Persisting with the “wars of others” narrative long after its premise has vanished serves only to justify the occupation and propagate their reality: that Israel remains, while everything else is mere fiction.
• As for the claim that Lebanon has sacrificed too much for Palestine, its proponents must also address the issue of naturalisation. Is preventing the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees still a Lebanese national priority? If so, what alternative exists besides supporting the Palestinian cause until the right of return is realised? Or is this newfound exhaustion merely a prelude to accepting naturalisation?
• These are outdated, hollow equations, ill-timed and irrelevant.
