March 19, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• In the two months following the ceasefire in Gaza, developments unfolded within the occupying entity and between it and Washington. Despite deep political divisions and the declining popularity of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, leadership changes within military and security institutions were swiftly implemented to ensure full alignment with Netanyahu’s vision. Simultaneously, arms and ammunition transfers between Washington and Tel Aviv were in full swing, signaling preparations for a significant impending military action.
• There is little need for scrutiny to recognise that the wars in Yemen and Gaza are driven by a single agenda. This is not about U.S. President Donald Trump’s anger toward Yemen, nor is it merely a response to Hamas rejecting proposals from U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff, prompting Netanyahu to launch a war that Washington then deemed justified, as stated in the White House’s response to the brutal aggression on Gaza. The sheer simultaneity and interconnectedness of the two wars leave no room for doubt: they are complementary battles. The pressing question is what these wars seek to achieve, given that over a year of similar conflicts failed to dismantle Yemen’s strategic position in the Red Sea or alter the resistance equation in Gaza.
• The conclusion of the first phase was clear: U.S.-Israeli coordination ensured that the second phase of the ceasefire agreement would not proceed. Advancing the agreement would have meant acknowledging a withdrawal from Gaza and ending the war – an outcome that could have unraveled Netanyahu’s government. Instead, the strategy shifted to starvation tactics by halting humanitarian aid. Yemen’s response was the reinstatement of the naval blockade, prompting an immediate American military response. Washington’s role was to pave the way for Israeli military action against Gaza by striking Yemen, which had become a crucial support force disrupting stability within the occupying entity and impacting its internal security. The purpose of the U.S. strikes was twofold: to weaken Yemen’s capacity to provide support by targeting the depth of the occupying entity and to force Yemen’s forces into a defensive posture. But what is the ultimate agenda of this war?
• The Americans and Israelis are fully aware that any war on Yemen and Gaza faces three insurmountable barriers. The first is that the people will not surrender, Gaza’s residents will neither raise the white flag nor accept displacement, just as the Yemenis will not raise the white flag nor abandon their support for Gaza. The second is that eliminating the resistance and its capabilities is impossible; the past year and three months of war in both Yemen and Gaza has proven that the resistance possesses the skills of concealment, fortification, and maneuvering necessary for survival and continued combat. The third is that breaking their will is unattainable. No matter how many leaders are assassinated or how great the inflicted losses, the determination of decision-makers in both Yemen and Gaza remains steadfast, with no retreat from their known negotiating positions. The question remains: have the Americans and Israelis set new objectives to achieve?
• In early November 2023, Israeli and American newspapers were filled with analyses referencing U.S. and Israeli experts, drawing parallels to the Israeli war on Lebanon in 1982, which culminated in the expulsion of Palestinian Liberation Organisation fighters and leaders from Beirut. Some now believe that what was impossible in 2023 and 2024 could become feasible in 2025 due to several factors: first, the assassination of Hamas’s key leaders, including Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, and Mohammed Deif; the second is the assassination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah; the third is the neutralisation of Lebanon and Iraq as support fronts; the fourth is the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, leading to Syria’s realignment away from the Axis of Resistance despite historical ties between Hamas and the new regime; and fifth is Donald Trump’s return to the White House.
Under these conditions, an intense military campaign lasting several weeks – one where Yemen faces extreme pressure and Gaza endures unrestrained brutal and barbaric slaughter, could create a climate for negotiations. This might allow for an amendment to the terms of the Gaza agreement, maintaining the war’s conclusion and the occupying army’s withdrawal while adding a new condition: the dismantling and removal of the military and leadership infrastructure of the resistance factions from Gaza.
• However, a fundamental difference exists between 1982 and 2025: in 1982, Palestinian resistance fighters were operating from Lebanon, a foreign land, whereas in 2025, they are defending their homeland in Gaza. This critical distinction was absent from the artificial intelligence-driven strategic models that recommended replicating the past.
