March 20, 2025
Nasser Kandil
• The synchronisation in timing and alignment of objectives between the war declared by U.S. President Donald Trump on Yemen and the war declared by Benjamin Netanyahu on Gaza dispels any notion of coincidence. Instead, it affirms that one war serves the other, revealing a deliberate strategy, a coordinated set of targets, and calculated objectives. What, then, is the fundamental purpose of this dual-front war?
• Trump initiated his war on Yemen in response to Yemen’s decision to reinstate its naval blockade until the siege on Gaza was lifted and aid was allowed to enter in accordance with a U.S.-brokered agreement, which Washington guaranteed Israel would uphold. Trump framed his war on Yemen under the pretext of securing maritime navigation and ensuring U.S. control over key waterways. However, in reality, he concealed its true purpose, as he and his military commanders knew that the stated goals were unattainable. After all, maritime navigation only faced disruption following the declaration of war on Yemen, and even then, the impact was limited to Israeli ports. As for regaining U.S. control over the Red Sea, over a year of extensive efforts ended in failure. What, then, has changed?
• Trump launched his war before Netanyahu’s to neutralise Yemeni support for Gaza ahead of Israel’s assault. The most the U.S. military could achieve was a war of attrition, drawing attention and resources away from Yemen’s ability to assist Gaza. Trump and Netanyahu both understood that Yemen’s support was a critical pressure point, as Israeli civilians endured the constant wail of sirens and sought shelter from Yemeni drones and missiles. To ensure the success of Netanyahu’s new campaign, it was imperative to minimise this Yemeni disruption as much as possible, precisely the underlying goal of the U.S. war on Yemen.
• Trump and Netanyahu recognise that their previous war objectives, eradicating the resistance or forcibly displacing Gaza’s population, exceed the war’s capacity. Even the forced exile of Hamas fighters, resistance leaders, and their weapons remains difficult to achieve. Thus, they continue to test the limits of pressure through killing, destruction, siege, and starvation while avoiding a ground invasion, which risks exposing the occupation army’s failure to secure a tangible victory. Instead, they are laying the groundwork for a negotiated settlement, drawing inspiration from the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon to craft a modified version for Gaza.
• With the conditions surrounding Gaza’s resistance having shifted, the loss of key leaders, the altered support dynamics from Lebanon and Iraq, and the U.S. effort to neutralise Yemen, why not test whether this renewed pressure could yield an agreement? An arrangement could see Hamas fighters pushed southward toward Netzarim, much like Hezbollah was confined north of the Litani River. Under the guise of self-defense, the occupation army would be granted ongoing military and security operations at a lower intensity than full-scale war, yet potentially more effective in targeting and eliminating resistance fighters, just as seen in Lebanon.
• The key obstacles for the U.S. and Israel are, first and foremost, time. The world is on high alert, with mounting political and popular pressure to halt the Gaza massacre. This time constraint also extends to Israel’s domestic front, where the issue of hostages is gaining momentum, rallying factions and institutions with increasing urgency, especially as the risk of further hostages being killed in the war grows. Yemen also presents a challenge, as its leadership prioritises striking deep into the occupying entity’s population and economic centers in support of Gaza, even over retaliating against direct U.S. aggression.
Yet, the most crucial lesson – one ingrained in Palestinian consciousness since the Sabra and Shatila massacres, is that surrendering arms guarantees nothing. No American pledge, whether made by Philip Habib in the past or by figures like Steve Wietcov today, will provide real protection.
• This new phase of war hinges on securing rapid gains before its momentum dissipates. Despite the bluster of Trump and Netanyahu, the architects of this war may ultimately be forced to halt it under unfavourable terms including celebrating bin Gavir rejoining Netenyahu’s government, unless they can manufacture an opportunity for progress, one that could prolong the war and stall the unraveling of Netanyahu’s fragile government.
