The fall of Astana in Geneva
Written by Nasser Kandil,
The meeting of Astana was not a technical meeting to ensure the cease-fire as much as it was an opportunity presented by Russia to Turkey for the positioning to a new bank in the war and to bring with it the armed factions that are known by Moscow for their historic and bloody terrorist backgrounds. The meeting’s center is to abandon Al Nusra front and to prepare to be included in an alliance entitled the war on Al Nusra and getting in exchange a role for Turkey and the factions in a political settlement under the ceiling of the Syrian constitution and under the leadership of the Syrian President and the Syrian army, that ends with new constitution and elections. The cease-fire was a Russian offering to Turkey and to the factions to facilitate that positioning, so it was an independent issue and not a goal in itself.
No matter how the factions supported by Turkey and Saudi Arabia especially the negotiating Riyadh’s delegation to improve the situation, the scene includes Al Nusra front, Alrahman corps supported by Turkey, and the Army of Islam operated by Saudi Arabia, knowing that they participated in Astana under the title of dismantling the relationship of Al Nusra from the factions, so this means the fall of Astana as a path and the return in the war on Syria to the stage post the dominance of the Syrian army and its allies on the eastern neighborhood of Aleppo and considering the attacks on Damascus and the countryside of Hama a reaction for Aleppo’s victory.
Turkey which tried to barter its involvement in Astana in the beginning with reserving a seat for it in the next US-Russian understanding that was delayed, so it tried to sell it to the Americans by showing hostility against Iran and to wait in Syria, and when the entry of Al Bab city was not useful as a passport to Manbej, and it was surprised by the red card of America it returned to the barter in Astana, then it retreated because it did not get from Moscow any position towards the Kurds that meets its aspirations to eradicate them is the same Turkey which returned to stand behind the factions to send messages and to say you cannot ignore me, there are still choices, and the only choice as it seems is the positioning with Saudi Arabia and Israel to play with the card of Al Nusra once again.
Being protected with Al Nusra and strengthening it to change the war rules and the negotiation is double-edged sword, if it succeeds it will change the equations temporarily through negative balance that imposes employing more of forces and capacities against Syria and its allies and thus the difficult long resolving, and if it fails then its consequences will be resounding in the field and in the negotiation. What has happened in Damascus and is going now successively in the countryside of Hama are clear decisive beginnings on the path of failure, so the impacts on Turkey and the factions will be farer than the field and the negotiation, because they will mean the fall of Astana’s path in Moscow.
Originally Astana path is Russian, it was not anymore a subject of enthusiasm neither in Damascus nor in Tehran nor for Hezbollah as was the truce on such days a year ago, but Russia is an important and main ally and the maturity of its choices quietly is an interest for the allies, because it is concerned to be a reference for the international disputes that grants opportunities to the peace and the political solutions. This is among the obligations of the superpower, which when it stops presenting solutions it hits strongly, accurately and decisively. Moscow has done that in Aleppo when it resolved that the way for the solutions has fallen, after it granted these solutions months of negotiation and understanding with Washington. This is the deepest meaning of the fall of Astana path.
A Russian recourse said that those who violated cease-fire in the countryside of Damascus and the countryside of Hama will pay high cost for their manipulation and their deception, so how if they fight with Al Nusra?
Translated by Lina Shehadeh,